John Lindsay-Poland. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, Edward George. Latin American Politics and Development. Harvey F. The Enduring Legacy. Miguel Tinker Salas. Seeking Refuge. Maria Cristina Garcia. We Cannot Remain Silent. Daniel J. The History of Cuba in 50 Events. Henry Freeman. Sparrow and the Hawk. Kyle Longley. From South Texas to the Nation. John Weber. Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America. Paul H. Listen, Yankee! Tom Hayden. Fidel Castro. Clive Foss. Hostile Intent: U.
Kristian Gustafson. Alex Moore. Walking the Forest with Chico Mendes. Gomercindo Rodrigues. Fidel Castro Ruz. To Sin Against Hope. Alfredo Gutierrez. Phillip Berryman. Spain and the American Civil War. Wayne H.
A History of Modern Brazil. Colin M. Beyond the Eagle's Shadow. Virginia Garrard-Burnett. Bracero Railroaders. Erasmo Gamboa. Oil and Nation. Stephen C.
Central America and the Treaty of Versailles. Michael Streeter. Military History of Angola. East Los Angeles. Richardo Romo.
James Lincoln Collier. Cuban Communism, Irving Louis Horowitz. Grounds for Dreaming. Lori A. Historical Dictionary of Peru. Peter F. Dying to Live. Joseph Nevins. Empire in Retreat. Victor Bulmer-Thomas. In from the Cold. Gilbert M. The Chavismo Files. Fermin Lares. Uprooting Community. Selfa A. First World Dreams. Alexander S. Joseph Smith. The Caribbean Basin. Graeme Mount. Gunboat Democracy. Russell Crandall. Families on Foot. Brew Davis. In Their Own Best Interest. Lars Schoultz. Dollar Diplomacy by Force.
Ellen D. The Salvador Option. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles. Alan L. Deborah Sundloff Schulz. Island at War. Hemispheric Giants. Britta H. Neighborly Adversaries. Michael J. The Political Future of Cuba. Jose Latour.
Gregory B. Troubled Neighbors. Henry Raymont. Thomas C. Seeking Peace in El Salvador. Soldiers of the Nation. Harry Franqui-Rivera. Breaking Up with Cuba. Daniel F. The Cuban Revolution. Luis Fernando Ayerbe. Emelio Betances. El Salvador in Transition. Philosophic attention to humanitarian interventions is not new. The seventeenth century jurist, Hugo Grotius, is credited with originating the modern conception of armed humanitarian intervention. If a tyrant … practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case ….
It would not follow that others may not take up arms for them. Classic theorists like St. In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill appealed to the importance of communal self-determination in providing consequentialist arguments limiting armed interventions. Consider this paradigm characterization of humanitarian interventions as:. Holzgrefe, A humanitarian intervention does not require the consent of the target state: it is a form of coercion.
The government is deemed culpable in the suffering of others that is to be prevented or ended. The purpose is not conquest, territorial control, support of insurrectionist or secessionist movements, regime change, or constitutional change of government. Humanitarian intervention vary in terms of motivations of a state in using military force. Other definitions attend more to the effects of intervening than to motivations. These definitional disputes involve evaluating actions on behalf of others. The issue, then, may be more a matter of how much normative work is to be done by definition rather than by a separable ethical judgment of the actions themselves.
Indeed, these semantic concerns are grounded ultimately in re-conceiving state sovereignty not as a right not to be transgressed by outsiders, but as a duty to protect the people of a state and, if needed, people of other states sec. Many differences of definition about what constitutes a humanitarian intervention reflect varying views about the normative merits and justifications for using force to address the suffering of others at the hands of their own government.
Even proponents of humanitarian intervention advocate very limited circumstances where such uses of military force are justifiable. In particular, proponents attempt to specify minimum, threshold conditions in terms of the severity, scale, and kinds of human suffering necessary but not sufficient to justify intervention.
Common among specifications of threshold conditions are requirements that the most basic of human rights are being violated, that the human suffering is widespread and systematic, and that the government bears some culpability for what is happening to its people. Interventions, then, are justifiable only to address the most egregious violations; the threshold conditions in the target state must be those that, as Walzer put it, "shock the conscience of mankind. Specifications of threshold conditions raise several issues. A specification of the conditions of suffering will be inherently vague.
How many rights violations or how many horrors or how extraordinary must the violations be in order to satisfy the threshold condition for armed intervention?
A second issue involves the invoked notion of basic human rights. Attention to violations of basic human rights, however, presupposes a hierarchy of such rights for all humans. International human rights law introduces yet other hierarchies which may be relevant. Government culpability must satisfy certain threshold conditions. Or government may be complicit, indirectly fostering human rights violations by providing funding, arms, or logistical support to private militias, by coordinating attacks on people through control of the communication infrastructure, or by inciting action through propaganda and other forms of media control.
This was the case in the Rwandan genocide of and during the violent campaigns by the janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, beginning about Or state involvement may be more akin to negligence, incompetence, or inability to govern. In inept or failed states, the government does not maintain effective control of territory and people.
In much of the country, people lived in fear of armed militias while the central government could not assert effective control.
The United States intervened militarily. The government culpability necessary to satisfy threshold conditions can range from perpetrator to failed state. Furthermore, situations often mask or complicate whether threshold conditions are satisfied. Widespread and systemic human suffering often occurs amidst or accompanying domestic insurrections, counter-insurgency campaigns, revolutions, liberation efforts, partition or secession battles, or civil wars, for example. In Darfur, the government of the Sudan claims to have been conducting a counter-insurgency campaign; the Bosnian War can be seen as part of a secession or partition battle; the Rwandan genocide occurred in the context of a civil war and struggle for power in the country.
The challenges here are both epistemic and conceptual. Satisfying threshold conditions of suffering may depend on the specific domestic contexts in which people and government find themselves. Though most discussions of humanitarian interventions specify threshold conditions in terms of human rights violations, other kinds of characterizations of the relevant human suffering are used by others.
There are justificatory implications for these kinds of differences.
A characterization in terms of human rights readily suggests deontological justifications for armed interventions. For any genuine right, others are bound by correlative duties. Thus, armed interventions are justified partially as discharging default duties correlated with the human rights that are being violated in the target state.
On the other hand, some see armed interventions as aimed at reducing human suffering, regardless of whether there are violations of specific human rights. Some feminists have argued that social oppression of women constitutes threshold conditions for forceful interventions Cudd. Uses of armed force, of course, have costs for human suffering, too. The idea is that sometimes the use of deadly force is justifiable to save lives and reduce total human suffering. Another development relevant to interventions is the concept of human security. The concept of human security is defined broadly both in terms of causes and kinds of human suffering.
The United Nations Development Program has adopted a similarly broad definition. With respect to threshold conditions for humanitarian interventions, using the broad concept of human security has some advantages. Determining whether threshold conditions are satisfied is also simpler without the need to apply specific legal or moral categories such as basic human rights or genocide. Furthermore, it is argued, the concept calls attention to preventing humanitarian emergencies from emerging, instead of focusing so much on armed interventions as reactions to emergencies.
But the breadth and scope of the concept also is challenging for use as a threshold condition for humanitarian interventions. Virtually any kind of widespread, systematic suffering or threat to people becomes a security issue possibly addressed by an armed intervention: many situations around the world thereby satisfy a requisite condition for justifiable intervention. For these and other reasons, the concept of human security is not often invoked in articulating threshold conditions for interventions. The satisfaction of specified threshold conditions and state culpability requirements are only necessary conditions for morally justifying humanitarian interventions.
There is a paradoxical quality in using deadly force to prevent or end violence against others. How can it be that war is warranted in the name of saving lives? As matter of morality and legality, individuals have rights of defense that permit using deadly force as proportionate response to unavoidable, imminent threats to our own lives or to the lives of others, whether the endangered people are kin, akin, or strangers.
By analogy, then, states have not only rights of self-defense if attacked, but rights to use deadly force in defense of others. A second analogy also sees states as persons. More direct arguments see a connection between taking universal human rights seriously and acting rightly with deadly force when this force is necessary to defend or protect those rights. Direct consequentialist arguments appeal to the morality of preventing extraordinary suffering when possible, that is, if and when there is opportunity and capability that is not more costly in its effects on human lives than not acting with deadly force.
Thus, there need not be inconsistency or paradox in saving lives by using armed force, at least in some grave circumstances. Is an intervention likely to succeed, or be worth the costs, on balance? Are there not non-military measures available to address the human suffering? What exactly is the purpose of the military action and how are armed forces to conduct themselves in defending, protecting, or rescuing others from their own government?
Just war theory—especially jus ad bellum— is the framework for making moral decisions about humanitarian interventions. Michael Walzer defends interventions in his classic work, Just and Unjust Wars , and again prominently in the Preface to the Third Edition of that book. Many critics challenge the suitability, adaptations, and implications of just war theory for humanitarian interventions. So, proponents, opponents, and cautionary discussants employ just war theory in exploring the moral merits of humanitarian interventions. There are additional reasons for relying on the jus bellum framework.
The most basic moral question of modern just war theory is delineating what states are permitted to do through the use of military force to those outside their borders and for achieving what aims or purposes. Second, the classic just war tradition includes attention to what are now called humanitarian interventions, at least as far as the cause and purpose of such military action.
Morally justifying humanitarian interventions, then, is often explored by interpreting, applying or adapting the standards for judging whether going to war is justified; receiving the most attention are issues of just cause and right authority for interventions. Other major facets of just war theory and its tradition — jus in bello , and jus post bellum — are also employed, though less prominently, as there has been much less philosophic attention to the conduct of interventions or what follows the use of armed force to rescue, protect, or defend others.
The jus ad bellum framework of just war theory identifies about a half dozen considerations relevant to justifying the recourse to war. All the ad bellum requirements must be satisfied for war to be justified. So, the use of armed force for humanitarian purposes is justified only if all six ad bellum requirements are satisfied.
Three of these considerations — last resort, likelihood of success, and proportionality — are consequentialist requirements. Proportionality, for example, requires that the benefits of military action are not overshadowed by the inevitable costs, destruction, and other negative effects. The other three jus ad bellum considerations — just cause, right authority, right intention — appear to be deontological, rooted in natural law, for example, human rights, or other normative, non-consequentialist principles.
In the just war tradition, just cause has long been among the basic considerations in determining whether the recourse to military force is justified. The idea is that certain circumstances rightly prompt and contribute significantly to a justification for a war. Supporters of justifiable interventions call attention to features of the just war tradition. One matter deals with the kind of moral foundations presupposed for just war theory itself. Some appeal to transnational ethical norms about rights or duties, whether expressed as universal natural law principles about rights of defense or duties correlated with universal human rights.
Discussions often challenge the adequacy of the analogies: states seem much unlike individuals when it comes to ethical norms. At one extreme, the world community is inter-national, a community of nations or sovereign states relating to one another by mutual agreement with one another; an opposing conception thinks of a global ethical order of trans-national norms about people that is, human rights.
In effect, some of the debate is couched in broad issues of how state-centered or people-centered the world ethical order is to be. Intention, or purpose, and authority have both been basic considerations in determining whether the recourse to military force is justified. Matters of intention, or purpose, have since not always been accorded independent status.
As noted in sec. I, the issue emerges as a matter of definition, and some maintain purity of motive is essential to being a humanitarian intervention. The classic just war tradition emphasizes issues about the locus of authority to deploy military force. For this and other reasons much discussion is devoted to whether interventions are justifiable when unauthorized by the United Nations and thus, illegal. In as much as impartiality is an ethical norm, there may be a strong presumption for only centrally authorized or multi-lateral interventions being justifiable.
In as much as speed of response to a supreme humanitarian emergency saves more lives and a single state can be more decisive, there is support for permitting unilateral and unauthorized interventions. Three additional jus ad bellum requirements also must be satisfied for a war to be justified. As applied to justifying an armed intervention, then, using military force to address a humanitarian emergency must be likely to succeed.
If such success is not likely, then the intervention is not justified. It also follows that inequality of military power among states is normatively significant.
A humanitarian intervention is not likely to succeed against large, powerful states, like China or Russia, while success is more likely for emergencies occurring in smaller, weaker nations; furthermore, large, militarily powerful states are more likely to be successful interveners than smaller, weaker nations or organizations. Indeed, on a literal construal of the requirement, no war ever satisfies this jus ad bellum requirement.
On the other hand, in law and morality, reactive wars of self-defense are justified, even though non-military means of resolution, in fact, are not attempted after an armed attack occurs. So, justifying a war as a last resort depends on at least two features of the specific situation: time, or urgency of action, and likelihood that non-military measures would succeed. Supreme humanitarian emergencies often exhibit urgency akin to that of a state facing a surprise attack or invasion: if lives are to be saved and people to be rescued, there is not time for peaceful pressure, coercion, diplomacy, negotiation, sanctions, or boycotts to work effectively.
The Rwandan genocide of vividly illustrated this sort of urgency. Aside from temporal considerations, intervening as a last resort involves assessing the likelihood of any non-military means being effective, but not necessarily actually implementing or trying all those means. But it does mean that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that … if the measure had been attempted it would not have succeeded.
This way of proceeding points to a second temporal feature of war as last resort. Some opponents of intervention bemoan the lack of infrastructure, for example, that would enrich and support effective, non-military means of defending and protecting basic human rights. The idea is that more could have been done to prevent horrors and to be ready to react non-militarily when emergencies do emerge. An issue here, then, is the time framework for constructing possible means of addressing the emergency.
A circumscribed last resort principle requires assessing the effectiveness of those means available at the time of the emergency, however rich or limited they may be. A broader last resort principle seems to deny armed force is a last resort if more could have been done in the past to enrich the availability of effective non-military means today. This broader construal, however, seems to conflate a call to build better prevention mechanisms with assessing military and non-military options available when supreme humanitarian emergencies actually occur and decisions have to be made.
The ad bellum principle addresses the general concern that the deaths, destruction, and other negative effects of war must be balanced by its benefits that is, success. This breadth of considerations brings to the fore difficult matters of the commensurablity of values and, as for any consequentialist argument, epistemic challenges related to the causal impacts of action. But a few thousand armed soldiers quickly deployed to Rwanda in April, , would likely have saved many, many lives, whereas militarily stopping the suffering of Chechnyans or Tibetans would very likely bring exorbitant costs in death and destruction.
In other cases the benefits of an armed intervention includes rescues of suffering peoples, a cost might be significant eroding of the stability and order of a system of states on the planet. Contributing to the challenges for the proportionality requirements are controversies about its structure: for example, whether an adequate macro-proportionality requires minimizing the bad effects, maximizing the net benefits, or minimizing the balance of benefits over bad effects.
Applied to justifying armed interventions, then, the macro-proportionality requirement speaks to a central concern, but cannot reliably discriminate finely among many humanitarian emergencies that arise. The general idea of proportionality is one that links the traditional division of just war theory into jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. Given the just war theory framework for justifying humanitarian interventions, these in bello considerations are relevant and applicable to uses of military force to address humanitarian emergencies.
If an armed intervention is be a fully just war, then, the rules of engagement ROEs need to reflect both in bello principles. These principles raise many issues for just war theory and some challenging ones for the morality of interventions. The in bello micro-proportionality requirement governs military operations during a war.
The general idea is to minimize the armed force used, and destruction caused, in order to attain a militarily necessary objective. But unlike the ad bellum the macro-proportionality requirement, in assessing the effects of a military operation, it matters much who benefits or suffers. First, combatant and non-combatants are to be distinguished.
This is the in bello principle of discrimination. The traditional in bello requirements of just war theory leads to challenges for this approach to the morality of humanitarian interventions. Interveners are there to protect and defend, akin to the mission of a police force. The 18 th century work of Immanuel Kant, in Perpetual Peace and elsewhere, is often credited with originating the notion of jus post bellum , though Vitoria and Suarez both earlier distinguish this facet of just war theory.
How one ends a war — even a just one — affects whether peace will follow, for how long, and the structure of the peace that will or should be. For example, is a just end of war establishment of the status quo ante bellum , which is perhaps plausible for wars of self-defense against an invasion? In international law and among just war theorists, this third major component of just war theory has received comparatively little attention. One important exception is the work of Brian Orend. Jus post bellum issues are important to the morality of humanitarian interventions.
Jus post bellum considerations lead to tensions and challenges for thinking about the purposes and morality of humanitarian interventions. For example, given the nature of supreme humanitarian emergencies, stopping the violence leaves a great need for extremely difficult reconciliation processes, a facet of rebuilding a functioning social order. Perhaps justice requires some punitive action towards perpetrators and accomplices, whether heads of state, government officials, or local militia leaders and private citizens.
These kinds of post bellum considerations effectively broaden and perhaps challenge just war thinking about the morality of humanitarian interventions. For example, if the ad bellum success requirement is more than rescuing, defending, or protecting victims, but also includes justice retributive, distributive, restorative or rebuilding, then the challenges of success are much greater, the likelihood of success is much less, the capabilities for success including political will are rarely available.
On the other hand, one can look at the responsibility to rebuild or seek justice post bellum as a distinct phase following the humanitarian intervention proper. A fully just use of military force — even seen as rescue, protection, or defense — may require that some organization or states address post bellum issues and rebuilding once the violence is ended, but those needs need not be addressed by the interveners themselves.
Just war thinking then requires that interveners use military force with consideration of post bellum requirements, but the post-intervention missions need not be the action of the rescuer themselves. Just war theory, in its entirety, articulates appropriately high standards for morally judging war and for justifying humanitarian interventions. There are some significant implications of the just war framework for assessing the moral justifications for humanitarian interventions. There are, for example, daunting epistemic issues in establishing that threshold conditions are satisfied or in assessing the complex consequences of an intervention.
The latter is only aggravated by the near certainty of unintended consequences for military campaigns and by the frequent situation of estimating effects of using armed force in foreign lands and cultures. The same inequalities of capability result in an unequal distribution of the right or responsibility to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds, with all the attendant costs of such interventions. There is a basic deontic category issue in exploring the moral merits of humanitarian interventions via just war theory. Is a justified war a matter of a right, responsibility, or duty?
And what kind of right or duty is signaled by establishing that a war is justified? What kind of right or duty, then? Addressing such questions from a just war framework intersects with varying conceptions or analogies employed in discussing interventions. For example, one might consider interventions in defense of others as a right associated with rights of self-defense. Such a right of defense — of self or of others — is one that the right-holder chooses whether to exercise or not: just as there is no duty to fight in self-defense, then, there is no duty to use deadly force in defense of others.
Humanitarian interventions, then, are a matter of moral right, not duty or obligation; and they are what are called liberty-rights or discretionary rights of intervention. In as much as jus ad bellum principles identify when there is such a right to wage war, then they can be used to identify when there is a moral right to intervene militarily for humanitarian purposes.
In contrast, armed interventions are often portrayed in ways suggesting there is a duty to use military force to address humanitarian emergencies. A common conception is the notion of interventions as rescuing others. Such imperfect duties are not correlated with others having a right to be rescued, and wide discretion is accorded the obligated as to when, where, and how to discharge the duty.
It has also been suggested that interveners are more akin to a police force, which suggests that justified interventions are discharging a duty to protect and defend others in grave danger. A humanitarian intervention, it would seem, is justified under conditions analogous to those for domestically dispatching S. A challenge for either of these conceptions of interventions — as rescue or as constabulary — is a dissonance between a moral duty to use military force for humanitarian purposes and the kind of moral justification for waging war the jus ad bellum principles provide.
Does just war theory establish a moral duty to wage war? If not, how can jus ad bellum principles ever support a duty to intervene militarily? To speak of a moral duty to wage war is today not obviously plausible. The notion of a duty to wage war may be consistent with some classic contributors to the just war tradition, such as Aquinas. Late 20 th century theorists, like Michael Walzer, argue that sometimes there is a duty literally to combat evil. But the idea that just war theory establishes duties to wage some wars is controversial and defended by some for only quite unusual circumstances, of which, of course, a supreme humanitarian emergency may be one.
As some have argued, jus bellum can establish at most the moral permissibility or right of intervening; additional considerations are needed to establish humanitarian interventions as morally obligatory. One form of the argument is that, as a matter of international law, practice, and practicality, these correlative obligations fall largely upon national governments and international organizations for example, the United Nations. Others argue more forcefully that the logic of basic human rights establishes correlative duties to respect, protect, and defend.
In Basic Rights Princeton, , Henry Shue famously argues that a basic right such as the right not be killed arbitrarily entails not only duties not to kill, but duties to protect or enforce the right: a negative right such as the right not to be killed arbitrarily requires positive action by others as do positive rights to subsistence.
Furthermore, Shue argues later, if and when the primary holder of the correlative duties that is, the state fails to meet its obligations, then the duty to protect and defend human rights defaults to others. Thus, humanitarian interventions are justifiable as discharging a default duty to protect and defend basic human rights not being respected by the target state. Another, related argument to support a duty to intervene derives from theories of global distributive justice. Arguments appealing to rights and correlativity relations are not uncontroversial.
For those who distinguish positive and negative rights, for example, the correlative duty for a right to life is simply and only not to kill. Thus, so long as a state or international organization is not the perpetrator of atrocities against its own people, it would seem that correlative obligations have been satisfied without coming close to establishing military intervention as a duty. An issue in the background is what one takes to be the model for understanding human rights and the extent to which duties of respect and protection correlate with those rights and for whom or what.
Just war theory has been the most prominent framework for philosophic discussion of the morality of humanitarian interventions. Other relevant approaches include attention to international law and its ethical implications and an issue central to political philosophy, the concept of state sovereignty. Political realisms deny the applicability of moral norms to state behavior, including uses of military force. Pacifism typically denies the premise of just war theory, namely, that some wars are morally justifiable, even if waged for humanitarian purposes.
Much discussion of humanitarian interventions involves legal issues under the Charter of the United Nations, the central and paramount text of the international law of force. Philosophers of law have accorded relatively little attention to international law. Attending to the international law of force and human rights involves issues of interpretation, sources of law, ethics of acting illegally and reform, as well as the extent to which states or people ought to be at the center of the system. At the center of the international law about interventions are explicit provisions of the United Nations Charter and human rights treaties.
And since humanitarian emergencies typically do not threaten international peace and security, the text permits authorizing few, if any, interventions. Furthermore, the nine core human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly require only that each state respect, protect, and enforce the provisions listed, such as rights to life. Human rights, for example, may be transnational norms, but international law makes the respect, defense, and protection of those rights almost exclusively a domestic matter for each state.
So, to promote international peace and security, inter-state uses of armed force are severely limited by law, even when domestic violence against people may be widespread and systematic.