An airstrike, on the other hand, was almost risk free and ensured complete destruction. While Syria did have a sophisticated and advanced array of surface-to-air missile systems—purchased over the years from Russia—the IAF had experience flying over the country and it was unlikely that the missiles would suddenly now become a problem.
Israel wanted to humiliate Assad — who was vacationing there at the time — and send him a message to restrain his Lebanese terror proxy. The planes flew so low, they apparently shattered some of the palace windows. Some months later, the Air Force bombed an Islamic Jihad training base in Syria in response to a suicide bombing that killed 19 people.
In the raid on Iraq, IAF predictions were that it would lose at least two aircraft.
This work is an in-depth study of Syrian politics and foreign relations between and Previously unstudied aspects of Syrian covert intervention in the . Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era Hardcover – April 11, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations. Killer Elite: Completely Revised and Updated: The Inside Story of America's.
This time around, an airstrike had little downside. Yes, there were always risks when crossing borders and entering enemy airspace, but the reactor was just about kilometers from Israel. All of the planes and pilots were expected to make it home safely. During briefings, Shkedi constantly emphasized three points — the need to avoid detection, to destroy the target and to get home safely. The pilots trained for months but were given very few details.
They were told the range, the fact that the target would be a building and that they would need to fly silent and low to avoid radar detection. The exact nature of the target was kept a secret. Only those who needed to know knew. At least once a week the pilots would get together and conduct a practice flight somewhere over Israel or the Mediterranean.
The lead pilot, a major named Dror, drew an imaginary line in his head with the range and tried to calculate where and what the target could potentially be. Based on the secrecy, he knew one thing for sure—it was extremely important. The pilots had been handpicked by the top IAF brass and included Dror, who had just completed a term as a deputy squadron commander and his direct commander in the squadron. The oldest pilot was a year-old reservist. The youngest was a talented year-old fresh graduate from flight school.
A group of individuals, most of whom are the same approximate age, having similar ideas, problems, attitudes etc. Sort order. Serve the people you are most prepared to serve — your training, experiences, abilities equip you to do. Red Alert Universe. In particular, our results show that the coordination required between legitimate parties to achieve covert communication can be achieved with a negligible number of secret key bits. Figure 2 Simplified model of a lossy bosonic channel. Since this invisibility logic is tied to the special walk animation logic enabled on the dinosaur units, third party fixes available back then 'solved' the problem by disabling that option on all dinosaurs.
The longer Israel waited, he warned, the greater the chance that Assad would discover that his secret was out. The relationship between the two Ehuds was going from bad to worse. At one point, Olmert toyed with the idea of firing Barak. In the end, he decided not to. Firing a defense minister in Israel would raise too many questions. It would be extremely difficult to continue keeping the existence of the reactor a secret.
Additionally, there was a chance that war would break out and Olmert needed the country to believe that it had leadership that was stable. Dagan told the ministers that he had just gotten off the phone with Hayden, the CIA director, and new U. The Americans knew, Dagan said, the British knew and now close to 2, people in Israel knew. It was becoming harder and harder to keep the information contained. All it would take, he said, was one news article or blog post.
If Assad discovered that Israel knew, everything would change. The reactor was on its way to turning hot. The water canal was almost completed and the fuel rods were believed to be in place. The moment they went hot, Israel would not be able to attack. Surprisingly, Barak seemed to disagree. But here, accounts of the disagreement differ. Some members of the Security Cabinet remember Barak claiming that Yadlin was wrong.
First, he apparently said, the reactor could be attacked at a later date, even after it went hot. The dispersion of the radioactive material, he claimed, would not be as bad as Yadlin made it out to be. Israel, he argued, could even wait until April. Barak then suggested the possibility of striking just part of the reactor. No one really understood what he was talking about but that often seemed to be the case with Barak, whose tactical brilliance was legendary in the IDF. Yadlin was in shock. He knew he would be risking his position in the IDF and that under the chain of command he was subordinate to the defense minister.
Israel, Barak said, did not need to chain itself to deadlines. There were other considerations, like preparations for war, he said, that needed to be accounted for ahead of a final decision. The ministers sat in awe at the power struggle playing out before them. Instead, he silenced Barak. Yadlin, who was also present, became visibly upset. His face turned red and he banged on the table. Yadlin proceeded to give a detailed analysis of the Syrian nuclear program as well as the dangers it posed. Israel, he concluded, had no choice but to act.
Olmert adjourned the meeting but not before he looked each minister in the eye. Some of them were still in shock from the spectacle they had just witnessed. A week later, there was another cabinet meeting and to this one, Olmert came prepared. Together with Turbowicz, his chief of staff, he had drafted a long speech.
It took 40 minutes to deliver and contained all of the details of the discovery of the reactor, the planning, the engagement with the Americans and the final issues that remained unresolved. Israel, Olmert said, had no choice but to attack and destroy the reactor. He went on to dissect every claim made by Barak and to reject it. The tension between the two politicians continued. Olmert sent a letter back with the courier. A few days later, Barak paid a visit to IAF headquarters. There, Shkedi took the defense minister aside and pulled a napkin from a nearby table. While to some of the other cabinet members it seemed like Barak was stalling for time, he was convinced that he was simply doing what he had been elected to do—challenge conventional thinking and come up with the best plan possible.
As the final cabinet meeting approached, the large-scale airstrike was still on the table as well as other options, including the newly-crafted quiet airstrike. The problem was that even within the IDF, there was a difference of opinions about the right option to use in the attack. Ashkenazi, for example, preferred an airstrike while Barak and Yadlin preferred one of the other more covert options.
Nevertheless, Barak gave instructions to continue to hone all the different plans. Satellite footage did not detect any armed guards near the reactor. Barak, himself a former commander of Sayeret Matkal, had faith that all of the options could work. The decision would be made at the final cabinet meeting. But Barak also knew what it was like being an IDF chief of staff. It was important, Barak believed, that they come together to the final cabinet meeting with a unified recommendation.
As the debates continued, Yadlin arrived late one night at his house in a tranquil and picturesque farm community in the center of the country. Yadlin stood there in the dark, thinking about what would happen if the attack went ahead.
On the one hand, he was confident that Israel could pull it off. According to updated intelligence in Israel, Assad was under the impression that Israel and the United States were planning a joint and simultaneous attack against Iran, Syria and Lebanon in the coming weeks, around the same time as the planned bombing of the reactor. As a result, he had put his Scud missile batteries on high alert. Some of them were even in their launchers, already pointed at their designated targets inside Israel. Here he was, one of the pilots who destroyed the Osirak reactor in , involved in planning the destruction of another reactor.
He was bothered by a nagging question—how long could this go on for? Is Israel destined to live by the sword forever? Will it need to continue bombing nuclear reactors throughout the Middle East for eternity or will Israel, at some point, suffice with the deterrence it has managed to establish to protect itself? It was an impossible dilemma. If Israel attacked the reactor, it ran the risk of instigating a devastating war with Syria. As head of Aman, Yadlin had a front row seat to the deliberations and debates that others sat in on in He used to think that being a pilot was difficult. Now, he understood the gravity of being a decision maker who, by making what might seem like a simple tactical decision, could be sending his or her country into a full-fledged war.
The sense of uncertainty was overwhelming. On September 5, Olmert convened his Security Cabinet for a final meeting. New satellite footage showed that construction of the reactor was nearly complete as was the digging of the water canal from the Euphrates to the reactor. Aman believed the facility was close to being activated.
In addition, out of the blue, some journalists were asking questions about rumors they had heard of an impending Israeli military strike against Syria. One of the journalists worked for an American newspaper, one that was not bound by Israeli military censor rules. Ashkenazi started to genuinely fear that word was going to leak out.
There was no time left. It was going to be a long meeting. The ministers gathered at 10 a. It was a standard press release, like hundreds before it. Yadlin and Dagan opened the meeting, going through the intelligence which everyone was intimately familiar with by now. Aman had prepared a graph it projected on a screen showing the risks of each stage of the operation with different arrows and different colors from red for high to yellow for low. Once the intelligence chiefs finished, Shkedi and Ashkenazi presented the operational plans.
There was still a debate over exactly how to carry out the attack. Ashkenazi asked the cabinet to approve the strike but to leave the decision on the way it should be carried out up to him and the trio that would ultimately determine the timing of the attack—Olmert, Barak and Livni. Ashkenazi had continued to work on all of the different options. As the cabinet was meeting, the air force was still in the process of making its final preparations. Recognizing the significance of the moment, Olmert decided to let all of the ministers speak.
It was dramatic. Each minister laid out his and her opinion, hopes and beliefs. Some expressed hesitation. Others, like Herzog had little to say. Livni gave an important insight. In wars, she pointed out, countries often sought victory images to be able to claim that they had won and their opponent had lost.
Those images are usually obtained—if at all—at the end of the fighting—conquered territory, bombed-out enemy bases or a flag raised above an enemy capital city. In this case, she said, Israel will have the image—of the destroyed reactor—right at the beginning. This meant that depending on the response from Assad, Israel could potentially restrain itself and not respond, thereby preventing a greater escalation. If a Syrian missile landed on a kindergarten or shopping mall and caused mass casualties, the public would demand a fierce response. The path to war would then be quick.
All of the ministers except one—Dichter, the former head of the Shin Bet—voted in favor of attacking the reactor and authorized the ministerial trio to decide on the timing and method. While the ministers all leaned towards the option that would destroy the reactor and minimize the chance of war, the final decision was left up to Olmert, Barak and Livni. Assassins and Thuggery. The Macmillan Doctrine. The Musketeers in Yemen. The Secret Intelligence Service. The Last of the Colonial Wars. The Slow Death of the Cold War. On Her Majestys Secret Service.
CR Central Registry. He has written a number of books on the role of security and intelligence services and lives in the north of England. The Second World War. The WorldView. Bloch Phys.
A 99 , — Published 20 May Abstract Covert and secret quantum key distribution aims at generating information-theoretically secret bits between distant legitimate parties in a manner that remains provably undetectable by an adversary. Research Areas. Quantum channels Quantum cryptography Quantum tomography. Issue Vol. Authorization Required. Log In. Figure 1 Model of covert and secret key expansion. Figure 2 Simplified model of a lossy bosonic channel. Figure 3 Covert and secret key generation throughput as a function of Eve's dark count rate.