The lifting is important, but Emily and I got together because we had no friends and we thought that friendship is better than solitude. If this is true, lifting the logs belongs to our common good, and friendship also belongs to our common good. But make me wiser: If we could have only one good and were to choose between lifting and friendship, which good would you judge better and worthier? What a question! I would call friendship the highest good among people.
What are you saying, Emily? Are you saying that, as we gather here to collect logs and become friends, if we failed to gather the logs but became friends we would be better off than if we failed to become friends but collected the logs? Is this what you are saying? You can engrave that on gold! But does this apply only to us or perhaps to all people that might gather together and do something in common? To all of them, I would say. What you are saying, then, is that people who gather together to achieve a common good will never achieve a good higher than friendship, and that without friendship no common good will be true.
Why, the people, not being real friends, will be half strangers, and either will their good not be common or their things in common not good. You put it perfectly, man alive! I am just wondering. Imagine if, instead of only you, suddenly a hundred people turned up to help my lifting. I am trying to think how that would work. I am sure all of them would have a great heart, but what do you think: Would it be better to let everyone work spontaneously as they wish, or would you rather have someone guiding their work and giving instructions here and there?
If the guide really knows what she is talking about when giving instruction, that will be a relief. Emily, I hate to mention this, but I have to: If these wonderful people were to stay for the night, and after that for a month, and after that they settled, would it not be better for this settlement to choose one or two guides?
You take the words out of my mouth: The guide, then, would become a kind of ruler, an authority to be obeyed, and those who obey would be ruled. But I am not sure how this authority should work. Neither am I, but we are looking at something much simpler than that now. We can agree, at any rate, that we do not need to wander too far to find a settlement, a community or any other kind of livelihood where there are the rulers and the ruled, and where the rulers have authority over the ruled.
This is very much the way of the world, I dare say! Perfect, Emily, just be so kind and let me know what you think. Which is the better livelihood: that of friends ruling over friends, or that of strangers ruling over strangers? Definitely the first. It follows from what you were saying. Then it is much easier, in a settlement of twenty, fifty, or even a hundred, to have friends ruling over friends. How many people live in your country, Emily? Ten million? Eighty million? Is there any doubt, then, that in such a country there will never be friends ruling over friends, but always strangers ruling over strangers?
This is quite a sad truth, I must say. It depends on the way you look at it. No truth is sad when it teaches, and what this truth teaches me is this: When people are seeking a good kind of livelihood, one where the highest common good can be achieved, they have to avoid the place and the case where you have strangers ruling over strangers. Provided this is feasible. This is not the way of looking at it. Nothing untried is feasible. But my friend, my country is only one of hundreds of states with millions of people, strangers to each other, and ruled by strangers.
How will you change that? You can start by helping me with the lifting, Emily! What makes you think that, being born in such an overcrowded place, you are obliged to stay? While respecting both the rulers and the ruled who choose to live and stay, you can always withdraw. Yet I can imagine what someone may say. Are you trying to say people should leave cities and avoid state administration and join your primitive settlement in the middle of nowhere?
Do you think anyone will leave the comfort of civilisation, the opportunities of their jobs, their culture and their prosperity to embark on such an adventure? Sure, life in modern states is not perfect, but it has also many benefits and people should stay! I guess we would be quite at a loss. I do confess I have a thrill when I hear of states with a hundred thousand, nay one million, nay one billion inhabitants on the globe, thriving and bringing further and further the cause of civilisation. Just come and tell us, then: What is the highest good these states have achieved?
Or perhaps you may say they have not achieved much but they still can and will. Shall we say they will have achieved the highest good once everybody has a car? That would be laughable! Why would that be laughable? Is it because everybody having a car is not good enough or because we are going in the wrong direction altogether? Perhaps we should consider both cases. So be it! Why not enough? Well, there are cars and cars, and if you measure the highest good in terms of cars, then we must say that the better the cars the higher the common good, and the more people have the best cars the higher the common good.
Sure, at least following the assumption. Very well! Yet then, cars would not be enough, for good cars need a good garage, and a good garage requires a good house, and a good house requires a good job, and the better the house and the job, the higher the common good. Does this not follow from the assumption too? We know it does. See how interesting now, and think for yourself: Why do people like Gregory focus on a good car, a good house and a good job? Is it because they believe that a good car, a good house and a good job will make them better as individuals and improve their character, or is it because of something else?
It is probably because of something else. And yet they would still say that, acquiring all these possessions, they are pursuing a good life, and that the well ordered state enables them to pursue a good life. Or would they not say such a thing? They would certainly say they are looking for a good life. Emily, excuse my ignorance: If we had the choice of only one, what would we call a truly good life: the life with a good car or the life with a good character?
A life with a good character, though most would choose the car. If what we say is true, then we could think of a marvellous state of one billion, say one trillion citizens, where everybody has the best possible car, the best possible house and the best possible job. Would that be good?
Is it not possible that in such a paradise people have the best possible cars and houses and jobs and still hate each other and live full of contempt and envy and mutual derision, behaving as badly as possible? It is possible. And yet, was this not the good life they were looking for, and was this not the good life their sophisticated state was supposed to provide?
Yes, you say! What is it then that is good about such a life? Gregory would say it is a life of benefits, and I will not say their life is useless, but what is the good this benefit represents? When they say good life they mean simply a life of comfort. Yet it is a sad a thing, Emily, that in their understanding the highest good is not friendship, but comfort. Why, you do not need a sophisticated state to enable friendship, but such a thing is needed to provide a place for their huge competition of comfort. Or do you think they hate each other so much because they want to be friends?
That would make no sense to me. They hate each other because each of them wants the best car, the best house and the best job. Is it not interesting that the outcome of a good life should be hate and a competition for comfort and money? If this is the highest good of civilisation, civilisation proves to be simply maximisation of comfort. Or should we rather ask what civilisation is?
We can. Excellent, Emily, thank you! This is one more reason for us to ask, then, what is the right direction for civilisation and what civilisation is. I can tell, this is not an easy task. For if we were to say that civilisation is about comfort, then it is useless for a truly good life, since we ascertained that the highest good is friendship and thus a good life is a life of friendship. On the other hand, if we say civilisation is about friendship, then we must call any tribe of gatherers and hunters where there was friendship civilised.
In this case, there would be no difference between gatherers and hunters on the one side and sophisticated states on the other side, since friendship can occur in both. This is why I do not really know what civilisation is and what difference it is supposed to make in regard to a truly good life. I try to avoid a useless word, and instead of referring to civilisation and primitivism as contrasts, the difference between which I am not able to explain, I simply acknowledge different forms of human livelihood which, since friendship is possible in all of them, are necessarily equal in value.
I definitely agree. Then let us not say, like Gregory, that someone is better off if he or she lives in a sophisticated state, encumbered with cars and houses and jobs. Well, never mind the cars and the houses, but I am not sure about the jobs. See what I mean: Where there are jobs there is work. Now is not work a good in itself? Emily, you speak as if the good of work had been invented by a sophisticated state some decades ago.
What makes you think that gatherers and hunters did not work? In fact, they did work! Not only they. Can you see those birds there? They are blackbirds. Now do birds not need to work as well? In which way? In such a way that their food is not provided automatically. They need to fly around and search for food, both for them and for their offspring.
Do you agree with this?
Therefore, looking for food is work. Getting food is work. It is. Looking for ways, planing how to get food is work. Making efforts to protect your body and thus save your life is work. This is true. What about this, Emily? Can we be friends if we do not know who we are and what friendship is?
Then an amount of knowledge is necessary. And can we save our life if we know not what to eat and how to get it? Then this knowledge is also needed. In this case, is getting knowledge not work as well? And knowledge as such leads to the truth. How else? Are you saying, then, that the search of truth is also work? It cannot not be. And yet, the body does not feed on truth. No, the mind feeds on truth, and knowledge for the mind can benefit the body too. Then work is any activity or effort to maintain our life, keeping the body alive with food and water, and the mind alive with knowledge and truth.
This is what work is! You see, Emily, there appears to be a difference between the concepts of work and job. For the gatherers and hunters certainly worked, but they had no jobs. What do you mean? You mean, they had no jobs because there was no specialisation of work but everyone did everything? Their work was certainly divided. To prepare a hunt, they had to know who would kill the animal, who would prepare the meat and so on.
Or do I talk nonsense? You are right. Then it is not specialisation that makes the difference between work and job, since work is any effort to protect your body and save your life as we saw. Now this effort is not uniform, but every one can focus on something different. Some will hunt in the forest and some prefer to go fishing.
All that is work. If we were to become lazy thinkers and to define things rather by examples than by proper definitions, and so I happened to ask you what a job is, which example would you give me? Never mind what it sounds like to me. You know what intrigues me: Why did this shop assistant choose to work in a shop?
He could have joined a group of hunters in the forest. I guess he found his work in a shop more comfortable than hunting. Then he is looking for comfort. Is he also looking for friendship? Let me tell you what I mean: Did the shop assistant apply for his job because he knew that the shopkeeper was a man of integrity, because he wanted to share in his prosperity and be his friend and friend of all in that shop, and also because he believed in the benefit of the products the shop is selling and wanted to be part of a noble cause?
Is that it? I see you hesitate, Emily. Or do you mean that the shop assistant was only looking for money, and that he would apply to whatever shop or company which paid him money and never mind whom he would meet and whether he would find any friends, so that if the shop pays him money he will stay, if not, he will go? What do you think? He is probably looking for money and not concerned about whom he will meet or the nature of what he is selling.
What about the shopkeeper who is employing this person? Is he employing the assistant because he wants to let the other share as much as possible in his prosperity, as a true friend would do, or is he just looking for whoever can do the most work for the lowest possible wage? The shopkeeper would rather have a slave if he could. You see then, Emily, what an interesting relationship arises between the shopkeeper and the shop assistant? As they care so little for each other, the shop assistant will work as little as possible and charge as much as he can, while the shopkeeper will pay as little as possible and expect as much as he can.
In fact, because his employee is not a slave but is being paid, he can treat the shop assistant as he wishes, since the assistant depends on the money, and the employer has the excuse that he is paying. Conversely, the more the shop attendant is badly treated, the less effort he will put into his work, since he knows he is being badly paid and badly treated. Is that it, Emily? What about the integrity of this kind of relationship?
There is little integrity, my friend, for this a relationship conditioned only by money. Emily, you have just given a definition of job! It is a work relationship conditioned only by money. So it seems. And if it be so, it is not conditioned by friendship. Not really. And those who are not friends we call strangers?
Then a job is also a relationship of strangers working with strangers. Is that true, or am I wrong? Excuse my repetitions, Emily, but I am just trying to understand where our argument is leading us. Have we not said that this is a relationship of little integrity? There is little integrity in all that. Then this is not the kind of relationship we want in the settlement we were just talking about. Good heavens, no! And is not the alternative of strangers working with strangers friends working with friends?
By all means. If we call the relationship of strangers working with strangers a job, a conventional means of money-getting not conducive to friendship, what should we call the relationship of friends working with friends? What should I say? A truer kind of cooperation? But surely, false cooperation is no cooperation at all, so that we either have true cooperation or none. Then there is no true form of cooperation in a job, and therefore no cooperation at all. This is what I mean when I say that gatherers and hunters worked but had no jobs.
They worked in cooperation, for even if their relationship was not conditioned by perfect friendship, it was not at all conditioned by money. In fact, two people could meet in a shop, either two shop assistants or even shop assistant and shopkeeper, and become friends, so that a relationship of strangers, originally conditioned by money, turns into something nobler and benefits the friends and their work. I could not agree more. Working relationships that start as jobs can evolve to cooperation. But it remains true that a job is a working relationship of strangers conditioned only, and only by money.
Besides, my dear, it seems to me that exceptions have something in common with coincidence and chance, and that chance is not much an object of knowledge, while probabilities have something in common with regularity, with a constant order able to be measured in some way, which seems closer to the character of knowledge than exceptions. For knowledge is knowledge of what is true, and what is true, if it can be known, must also be able to be measured, by perception or reason, and what can be measured can only be measured in its order, for what has no order cannot be measured, and what cannot be measured cannot be known.
I understand. And as we are trying to measure behaviour and relationships, we should rather look at what is orderly in them and not at what is coincidental or exceptional. If, on the other hand, we cannot measure behaviour as we measure numbers, and since we cannot measure what is always true about behaviour, we should strive to measure at least what is probable in it.
And if in this way we do not achieve unshakable knowledge, we are at least closer to knowledge and less helpless than if we just rely on coincidence and exception. Does it make sense to you? It does. Then let us still say, even if based on probability, that working relationships conditioned only, and only, by money are not conducive to friendship. Let me put it this way: Would you not conceive of a relationship between a slave and a master where true friendship arises? Could you exclude this possibility?
And yet this is not what is likely to arise from a relationship between slave and master. Then let ours be a settlement of friends working with friends. And let there be no jobs in this settlement, but only cooperation and working relationships conditioned not by money, but by good will. But friendship requires time. Or will anyone who turns up in the settlement become a friend of all immediately? But what do you think? Where there is not yet friendship, there can be at least the will towards friendship, the will to be a friend.
There can be. And we called friendship the highest good? We did. And the highest good is necessarily good? Needless to say. Then to move our will towards friendship, Emily, is to move our will towards the highest good, and this is therefore the best possible will. It is the good will par excellence. Would you like to point to a mistake in the text or otherwise react to this essay?
Please feel free to contact the editor under the e-mail address: carolingian use. Ao escrever sobre o sentimento de Guthlac pron. O que Guthlac fez foi simples. Em busca desta verdade, Guthlac viveu em retiro. Mas Guthlac venceu. Hoje se cruza, de trem, inteiros tratos de terra em poucas horas. Naquele tempo, eram viagens longas e perigosas. No tempo de Guthlac, parte da Inglaterra estava submersa no Mar do Norte. Mapa: Hel-hama, Wikimedia. Claviceps cravagem numa espiga de centeio.
Foto: Accipiter, Wikimedia. A poesia pode ser uma ponte. Foto: MS Folios 32vr, biblioteca da Catedral de Exeter. Assim, compus duas partes, Guthlac Alfa e Guthlac Omega. O eremita humildemente refuta todos os argumentos. Quando em Guthlac Alfa o anjo vem salvar o eremita, as palavras Felicidade quando os ambos se encontram, O homem bom e a anjo!
Ambos comumgam e tem lugar o milagre da luz e do perfume. With kind permission of Cambridge University Press, I will be experimenting with the King James Bible in my quest for a better spelling. My focus is the gospel of Mark , which is shorter and less pretentious in style. Why the King James Version? Firstly, I love it. Secondly, it is a wonderful relict of Early Modern English.
Thirdly, it helped shape our modern spelling. Bibles had a tremendous influence. Take the Luther Bible in Germany: It changed the history of a language. So did the King James Bible, it changed English. Just not for the best. I call it chancery spelling to pay due homage to the eccentric Lords of the Court of Chancery : They really knew better about English. An example of their ingenuity? Well, since o-sounds are written with a delightful au in French, why not spell doughter as daughter? Clearly, Chaucer must have been out of fashion to favour the former.
But the typesetters and pseudo-etymologists also left a wonderful contribution — ghost, doubt, gherkin, island. Those were the times when you could have a go at a language and just shape its spelling at will! Not even the chancery guys would still find it funny. Do you know the phonemes of English? Though the International Phonetic Alphabet dates back to the 19 th century, it is unfortunately barely known.
Chart: Alba English. You know what? I woke up with a longing for miracles. On the back of my head, the sweet relief and a heavenly certainty: Whatever non-sense I may come up with will never, never outbid the creative panache of the chancery Lords. To cut a long story short, here is my evolving draft for post-chancery bliss, which I am exemplifying on the King James Bible. How would I dare attack it? This is not a political statement or something. I just became aware of things when my beautiful work was done. In fact, the work was done many, many times.
What I have is a collection of reform drafts, and the experiment below is rendered in the third draft : a non-etymological, phonetic approach. It reflects a wider debate with reformers and critics. Yes, there are days in which I am in the mood to listen. The third draft is a moving testimony. The first draft was called Restored Latin Spelling. Then, I became aware of other reformers with older systems and similar names.
If you like horses and windmills, do join me in saving the world: Four chapters of the Gospel of Mark will be presented in a third draft rendition, with annotations in chancery spelling. The comments will focus first on vowels, then on consonants, and finally on special cases. They will be illustrating the above charts of vowels and consonants. I thus have the pleasure to present:. Shal, az, chapter: My aesthetics of orthography advocates the least visual impact.
Its first principle states: The most frequent phonemes should be rendered with the least innovative letters. Innovative is any letter that does not occur in English. The second principle of the least visual impact states: Innovative letters should be taken from the closest languages.
Remote sources are Dutch, Icelandic, Danish and Norwegian. This is an important principle. Yet these are difficult to produce on a keyboard. Before r , round vowels are long. There is no need for the forms aar oor. This derives from the third principle of the least visual impact: Any unnecessary doubling should be avoided. The case is different with eer , in which the second e is not a doubling of the first, but a schwa. These do not occur in General American. The innovative letter is taken from French and is recorded in Middle English calligraphy.
Priich, stuup: To reduce the visual impact of the uncommon doubling in ii uu , the alternative forms ie uo may be used: priich, mii, shuu, stuup; or priech, mie, shuo, stuop. But note the forms rekognaiz, riikonsider and priikonsiiv due to primary or secondary stress. Thus, following the third principle, is does not need to be doubled. Thus, periuz or peryuz, but yuz and never iuz. The renditions hi, yi, mi, bi etc. Jiizus, Nazareth, Jordan: There is no need for a special rendition for schwas, since most unstressed syllables in every word contain a schwa.
This being said, when a schwa is rendered by two vowels, these should be reduced to one. Vowels that are not universally silent should be kept. Thus, militeri instead of militri. Draivith, draivist, temptid : The verbal forms -eth, -est and -ed become -ith, -ist and -id. The letter c is left only in ch and foreign words. Similarly, qu becomes kw : kwiin, kwest, kworter. Note that yogh had a different use in Middle English. It is only the form I am borrowing. The beginning of the gospel of Mark, King James Bible, copy from the 19 th century.
From a private collection. The plural and third person sign is rendered as z even when the preceding consonant prevents a fully voiced articulation — paathz, profetz, skraibz, getz getith , putz putith etc. Though it be now obsolete, the long s is well documented in Modern English. Let, aloun, kool, shal: l renders both the clear l and the dark l. Any silent l is dropped: baam, kaam, paam, wook. Though it does not occur in any close language, it was invented by Benjamin Franklin. The first is taken from Middle English, the second is more obsolete than truly innovative, and the third dates back to the 18 th century.
Rhotic accents still occur in Britain. Imiidietly, komaand: The third principle of the least visual impact also applies to consonants: Any unnecessary doubling should be avoided. Note that, when the King James Version was written, h was silent, thus: an haus, an hundred, an hungred man. In the third draft, any silent h is dropped: auer, onor, onest, eer to the throne.
The prefix ex disappears. Those concerned with etymological signs should be reminded of the Italian spelling: esame, esagerato, esotico, eccentrico, eccellente. The third draft follows the Italian approach. Dheer, weer, born: The third draft gives rise to a number of homonyms: dheer there, their , weer where, wear , born born, borne , nou no, know , sou so, sow , bai buy, by , dhen than, then etc..
However, the context can easily reveal their meaning. The most serious practice is to dismember c into k and s. And hii arouz and foloud him. No language has a uniform use of c. Any use of c on its own is likely to cause confusion. Sinagog, blasfemi: The pseudo-Greek characters y rh ph are dropped. They do not reflect pronunciation, and they are not even accurate in showing etymology.
The Greek approach is the most serious. The title page to the first edition, by Cornelis Boel. Picture: Public domain.
In the comparative and superlative, ie never takes diaeresis: maitier, maitiest. The third draft proposes the following orthographic solutions:. And dhe wind siist, and dheer woz a greit kaam. Erste takte von Lachrimae Verae. Quelle: Musopen. CHOR: die kiste ist voll. CHOR: wie jetzt? CHOR: zehn milliarden auch? CHOR: hundert milliarden? CHOR: hundert trillionen? CHOR: alter, das ist krank von dir. CHOR: weisst du was, opa Paul? CHOR: wir treten der kirche bei. CHOR: jopp! Dieser essay ist in karolingischer rechtschreibung verfasst.
Quando em d. KAROLVS, gratia Dei rex Francorum et Langobardorum ac patricius Romanorum, Baugulfo abbati et omni congregationi, tibi etiam commissis fidelibus oratoribus nostris in omnipotentis Dei nomine amabilem direximus salutem. Notum igitur sit Deo placitae devotioni vestrae, quia nos una cum fidelibus nostris consideravimus utile esse, ut episcopia et monasteria nobis Christo propitio ad gubernandum commissa praeter regularis vitae ordinem atque sanctae religionis conversationem etiam in litterarum meditationibus eis qui donante Domino discere possunt secundum uniuscuiusque capacitatem docendi studium debeant impendere, qualiter, sicut regularis norma honestatem morum, ita quoque docendi et discendi instantia ordinet et ornet seriem verborum, ut, qui Deo placere appetunt recte vivendo, ei etiam placere non negligant recte loquendo.
Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere quam nosse, prius tamen est nosse quam facere. Debet ergo quisque discere quod optat implere, ut tanto uberibus quid agere debeat intelligat anima, quanto in omnipotentis Dei laudibus sine mendaciorum offendiculis cucurrerit lingua. Nam cum omnibus hominibus vitanda sint mendacia, quanto magis illi secundum possibilitatem declinare debent, qui ad hoc solummodo probantur electi, ut servire specialiter debeant veritati.
Nam cum nobis in his annis a nonnullis monasteriis saepius scripta dirigerentur, in quibus, quod pro nobis fratres ibidem commorantes in sacris et piis orationibus decertarent, significaretur, cognovimus in plerisque praefatis conscriptionibus eorundem et sensus rectos et sermones incultos; quia, quod pia devotio interius fideliter dictabat, hoc exterius propter negligentiam discendi lingua inerudita exprimere sine reprehensione non valebat.
Unde factum est, ut timere inciperemus, ne forte, sicut minor erat in scribendo prudentia, ita quoque et multo minor esset quam recte esse debuisset in sanctarum scripturarum ad intelligendum sapientia. Et bene novimus omnes, quia, quamvis periculosi sint errores verborum, multo periculosiores sunt errores sensuum. Quamobrem hortamur vos litterarum studia non solum non negligere, verum etiam humillima et Deo placita intentione ad hoc certatim discere, ut facilius et rectius divinarum scripturarum mysteria valeatis penetrare.
Cum autem in sacris paginis schemata, tropi et caetera his similia inserta inveniantur, nulli dubium est, quod ea unusquisque legens tanto citius spiritualiter intelligit, quanto prius in litterarum magisterio plenius instructus fuerit.
Tales vero ad hoc opus viri eligantur, qui et voluntatem et possibilitatem discendi et desiderium habeant alios instruendi. Et hoc tantum ea intentione agatur, qua devotione a nobis praecipitur. Optamus enim vos, sicut decet ecclesiae milites, et interius devotos et exterius doctos castosque bene vivendo et scholasticos bene loquendo, ut, quicunque vos propter nomen Domini et sanctae conversationis nobilitatem ad videndum expetierit, sicut de aspectu vestro aedificatur visus, ita quoque de sapientia vestra, quam in legendo seu cantando perceperit, instructus omnipotenti Domino gratias agendo gaudens redeat.
Huius itaque epistolae exemplaria ad omnes suffragantes tuosque coepiscopos et per universa monasteria dirigi non negligas, si gratiam nostram habere vis. Alfred Boretius , p. Orthographia originalis retenta est. The Carolingian — culture, arts, aesthetics, is a private journal open to letters and submissions in any language. We encourage submissions in Latin.
Contact: ad. Gregorius Vatis Advena 12 th July Aesthetica nostrae aetatis vertitur tamquam sub umbra paradeigmatos originalitatis, quod nomen non athibeo secundum classicam, verum consuetam proprietatem. Ut inprimis quaestio explanetur, duo sunt conceptus. Alter asseverat usum verbi vel nominis esse proprium ubi similis fuit Ciceronis vel classicorum: proprietas classica. Alter affirmat etiam esse proprium cum omnes hodierni sermones idem verbum eodem sensu abhibuerunt: proprietas consueta. Hoc modo non est neologismus, potius assimilatio.
Itaque ne miretur lector si hic verba secundum consuetudinem assimilantur. In dubio notetur abbreviatio u. Conceptus a tempore venit quo Hegel philosophus in Acroasi de Aesthetica affirmat originem pulchri haud posse mechanicam technicam esse. Respondebat illis qui sub simulatione classicae curae superficialem antiquissimorum modi imitationem producebant.
Quae nil erat quam repetitiva perpetuatio u. Hic est nucleus Romanticae criticae u. Bellum non e mechanica quadam methodo sed ex animi subjectivitate oritur. Postulatum est a poetis non classicorum, sed sua propria voce canere. Sed difficultas conceptui inhaeret: Quomodo metiantur voces ad originalitatem censendam? Nam si originale est sua propria loqui, quis iudicarit utrum ego scribens ipsa mea scribam annon? Non exstat obiectivum criterion quod distinguat quae vox cui homini sit. Non exstat obiectiva mensura. Talis quaesitio est fallacia quae ad puerile iudicium duxerit.
Et videamus rationem: Si mensurabilis est originalitas, iudicium eam metitur secundum differentiam. Originale fuerit opus quod differt ab aliis. Vere dictum? Contradicit bonam praemissam romanticam: Vox, si vere intima, immensurabilis — sin autem mensurabilis, iam non intima! Ergo, quomodo proponunt se criteriis novitatis ac differentiae originalitatem metiri?
Si originalitas est tantum differentia et novitas adversus alios, paradeigma fit mechanica technica, fixum archetypon, perfectum exemplar. Ubi tunc libertas? Nam quid magis importans u.
Si finis tantummodo ab aliis differre, non est necesse scire quid dicere velis, satis est differre. Tamen, qui libere cogitat libertatem tenet consentiendi cum aliis. Sed consensus exstinguit differentiam. Exstinguitne originalitatem? Novum quod differt potest originale esse, sed aliis similare non eget ipso facto originalitate. Nonne meministis Aristotelen? Quod pro metaphyisicis valet, valet pro arte. Neque est omnis opera aliae similis deliberata imitatio. Itaque non est necesse vox differatur ab omnibus ut propria sit — necesse contra quaerere: Cur est mea similaris aliae, aut melius: Quare dissimilis fuerit?
In hodierno mundo vivunt septem milliarda quorum tertia pars sibi nomen artificis arrogat. Num speras fore ut nemo milliardorum dicat quod ab aliis iam dictum? Ergo, sit acceptabile u. Ubi tot de iisdem tractant, exaggeratum est postulare absolutam differentiam ac novitatem. Magis opportunum observare quid dicat quisque. Omnis ars pulchrum quoddam quaerit, sed consideremus quoque relationem u. Mathematica videtur speculum veritatis, etsi non cunctarum rerum quas conceptus continet.
Problema omnis artificis id est: Quae est artis prioritas u. Alterum non praecludit alterum, sed ad ultimum finem spectamus. Nulla ars exsistit sine humana vita, quo ars non est absoluta abstractio u. Hoc dicto, quod pulchrum dicitur non videtur eandem orientationem offerre ac verum, cum non sit necesse pulchrum esse verum. Quod non verum est, est falsum. Itaque ars quae mendacio nititur, etsi pulchra, frivolae delectationis est. Non est ulla originalitas in hac affirmatione. Sed veritas. Quae veritas magis importans. At pulchrum, inquit modernorum quidam, eget originalitate. Age crepusculum, nonne bellum est?
Bellum, ait, bellum. Tamen, non est originale. Quotidie repetitur. Mathematicane bella? Pulchra, ait, pulcherrima. Non est originalis. Non mutat. Ne pulchrum quidem, ut videtur, originalitate eget. Et verum, si magis importans pulchro, est originali magis importans. Fortasse originale est crepusculum, quia, quamquam repetitur, tamen e se ipsum oritur cursum de nihilo pendens et ergo verum est adversus se ipsum. Similariter, originale est rursus dicere verum.
Contra, omni die aliter dicere ostendit differentiam, non veritatem. Originalis est vox tantum per sese ipsa veritatem quaerens. Bene dictum? Sed tunc, cur orginalitatem cupierit si melius est veritatem non sola sed cum aliis quaerere? Nam quod communi studio quaeritur facilius invenitur. Unde colligitur metam originalitatis non esse veritatem quaerere. Quare originitatem quaeramus?
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Si vera ars de veritate versat, quae vox est audienda — artificis aut veritatis? Veritatis, inquiat, per artificis. Nihil mutat: Vox veritatis est importantior voce veritatem dicentis, quia veritatem dicens servit veritati. Implicationes u. Multae: Omnis ars est pulcher modus ostendendi quod verum est.
Sed verum non necesse est pulchre dici. Unde videmus veritatem non egere arte, sed artem veritate. Ars numquam se ipsa quaerit, quaerit veritatem. Originalitas est artificium, non finis, non vox quae sonat aequaliter in omnibus. Haec est aporia artis quae veritatem quaerit per pulchrum: Pulchrum nequit verum manifestare, sed ars sine veritate ars frivola. Itaque veritas non est modus dicendi, sed quod dicitur. Pulchritudo autem non est quod dicitur, sed tantum modus dicendi. Et modus mutat, cum status manet. Veritas non modus, sed status. Hoc si verum, quare antiquos imitati simus, quare modernos?
Melius valet primis cum verbis surgendis loqui. Quis dixit verbum necesse pulchrum esse? Ecce ne vereamur torquendo dicere verum. Aesthetica turgida ac taetra simul valet ac pulchra adulatoria, lingua torta lingua pulcherrima! Itaque duobus casibus fallaciam habes: a ubi antiquos imitari magis importans est quam verum dicere; b ubi differre ab antiquis est magis importans vero.
Alter est error classicismi, alter romantismi, quoniam veritas non est similitudo vel dissimilitudo cum antiquis. Principium nec sit exaggeratus conceptus originalitatis neque obstinata imitatio mechanica. Sed torqueant linguam ubi torqueri potest. Ecce torqueo et nomina nova accipio! Quae nomina differentibus modis oriuntur. Inventio fingit neologismos ubi assimilatio non est possibilis quia non habemus universalem consuetudinem.
Assimilatio adhibet nomina universaliter idem significantia. Verum appropriatio adhibet primam formam, i. Igitur tres sunt modi accipiendi:. Optimus modus est assimilatio proprietatis consuetae. Sed hic oportet duo videre: primum, ne mutetur significatio nominum quae iam proprietatem classicam habent; secundum, ne assimiletur nisi nomen quod vere ac praeter dubium omnibus sermonibus idem valet.
Praeterea, si nomen iam habet proprietatem classicam, abhibeatur tantum eo sensu. Cum autem non exstitit universalis consuetudo, assimilatio non est possibilis. Inventio interdum ingeniosa est, e. Inventio non est opportuna cum assimilatio facilior est, cum neologismus obscura ac nimie artificialia dedit. Si non exstat assimilanda consuetudo neque opportuna inventio, sique nomen globalifactum est, modus accipiendi est appropriatio. Igitur appropriatio eget declinationibus alienis quae primas et derivatas formas flectant. Tractamus enim de globalifactorum declinationibus quorum prima forma appropriatur, i.
Qua de causa eas appellamus declinationes alineas, inter quas videbimus:. Duo Casus Ablativi: Omnes declinationes alienae duos ablativos habent.
Primus ablativus est instrumentalis vel directus, quo utimur absoluto. Secundus ablativus est indirectus, quo utimur cum praepositione aut sicut verbi obiecto. Sic dicimus: Puer vivit cum Google, puer utitur Google, sed puer Googla quaerit. Gallica in -eu, -au mutant u in l , in -eau cadit e : tableau, tablalis, vinum bordeaux, vini bordalis sed urbs et civis sunt scilicet Burdigala, Burdigalius.
Prima forma et forma derivata : Prima forma est forma cuiusdam globalifacti quae immutata atque invariabilis adhibetur. In omnibus declinationibus alienis, casus nominativus, accusativus, vocativus et secundus ablativus primam formam nominis adhibentur. Aliter dicto, nominativus, accusativus, vocativus et secundus ablativus, quoniam eadem communi prima forma utuntur, non declinantur. Quae flavo colore significantur. Reliquae sunt formae derivatae, i. Nota infra primam formam flavo et derivatas caeruleo significatas:.
Casus genitivus, dativus et instrumentalis primus ablativus tamen possunt in prima forma adhiberi ubi alia phraseos membra iam casum indicarunt. Sic dicitur: impetus multorum hackerum vel impetus multorum hackers , sed tantum impetus hackerum. Similariter, in situationibus difficilibus licet prodeclinationem periphrasticam quandam adhibere sola cum prima forma, qua possibile fuerit dicere impetus hackerum et impetus de hackers :. Declinatio Romanica qua declinantur masculina Romanica globalifacta in -o, praecipue ex Italo et Ibericis sermonibus:. Quam formam nunc etiam primus ablativus habet.
Sic dixerimus: Lucretia cum libretti ambulat et librettis commovetur. Lucretia, quae non ambulabat cum sombrero, molestabatur dal macho, sed bona Lucretia machoi non cessit, non, Lucretia non cessit al macho! Quid fecit Lucretia? Lucretia nunc cum sombreros ambulat, Quirites, neque machis molestatur. Che bello, quam tortum, quam magna trascendentia! Impresario dedit Lucretiae libretto al macho! Thus Aristotle stresses the centrality of statesmanship, because in the scope of human politics rarely does one found new cities.
Founding a regime is an extreme situation, one in which political actors usually do not find themselves. Now, this does not mean that Aristotle rejects the idea of the best regime in theory, but rather he does not allow the best regime in theory to override the practical limitations of human nature. Unlike Plato, whose best regimes tend to forget that they are dealing with flesh and blood human beings, thus becoming practically impossible.
As I have argued, regime legislation cannot be central to human political experience in that it is an extreme human situation. On the other hand, statesmanship is central, because it deals with the daily activity of the political life. It stresses the importance of wisdom—what Aristotle calls phronesis—in human political activity, and this helps human beings to avoid either disaster or injustice.
It deals not only with preserving the regime but bettering it by making it more just. In doing this, statesmanship is more likely than regime legislation, to eventually make the actualization of the best regime. Practical reason. Natural law. Thomas- has corrupted the genuine structure of practical reasoning as it was conceived by Aristotle and later developed faithfully by Aquinas. In a certain way, the distortion of the concept of natural law principles must be attributed to Suarez, especially in the way in which he loses sight of the different nature of the premises of both speculative and practical reasoning.
Thanks largely to the studies on Aristotle done by Anscombe1 and Nussbaum2 that vindicate the specificity of practical reasoning as the Stagyrite conceived it, and thanks also to the neoclassical authors who are inspired by the moral philosophy of Grisez,3 a whole line of reflection has been opened, that questions the conventional image of iusnaturalism that in fact now has little to do with the doctrines of the authors especially Aristotle and St. Thomas on whom those doctrines were theoretically based.
I have recently translated it into Spanish in Persona y Derecho, 52, , The translation is preceded by a magnificent introductory study written by professor Eduardo Ortiz. A new interpretation of first principles and of the other principles of natural law Principles of natural law are principles of human action. These principles of action constitute the premises of practical reasoning.
Such premises are the aims or goods towards which the practical reasoning is directed in view of them, practical reasoning is constructed. If these premises are the ends of the action, they are not very gene- ral norms only in view of such ends, and after the knowledge of them, we make the precepts, with which we describe those aims and we determine the way in which we obtain them.
If they are called principles, it is because from them that practical reasoning begins, because practical reasoning always begins with a desired end, which is the last in the acquisition. If principles of practical reasoning are the ends of the act, they will be as much more principles the more ultimate they are. And it is absurd to think that man could have many final ends because, otherwise, it would be necessary to admit that man is a naturally amorphous being, because he could realize himself in any direction and in any way; but such an idea is counter to common experience.
Thomas explains this by saying that the last end of a substance is its ultimate or final form, and that man reaches such an end by means of his morally good actions, because the fundamental criterion of morality of human action —as we will see later will be determined in the last instance in view of the last end. On the other hand, it is an evident fact that man naturally tends towards certain ends, or what is the same, with appetites for certain goods, and that thanks to those appetites we deliberate. A person who does not have any certain end to obtain, that is, a completely apathetic person, would not have any inclination to deliberate, and therefore, he could not even engage in practical reasoning.
Normally, by its appetizing movement, each animal finds itself tending towards its own good. Irrational animals satisfy their appetites or instincts without knowing why they satisfy them, or at least without perceiving the internal hierarchy between their own appetites, and by all means, without being conscious that, when trying to obtain their own good, they enable other animals to effectively tend to their own as well.
Presupposed in any choice is the existence of an appetite in view of which one chooses one thing or another. And in the hierarchy of appetites there is an appetite that man cannot fail to choose: it is the appetite of happiness, fullness, unrestricted good, or however it is called. Nobody, in his healthy judgment, can elect not to be happy. It is, therefore, in view of this appetite how we assess the right measure by which to satisfy the subordinated appetites. Man, thanks to suitable instruction and by means of the reiterated exercise of correct actions, is used to his inferior appetites to desire in the right measure, so that all and each one of the appetites plays in favour of the appetite for happiness.
Certainly all the appetites have an original direction towards their own corresponding good, and all the appetites have a natural correlation to each other, in such a way that the inferior appetites are at the service of and integrated into the superior appetites. For example, the nutritive appetite is at the service of and integrated under the most general appetite of preservation in the being, that, as well, is subordinated to a more general appetite of fullness or happiness thanks to the fact that man flees passionately from death, he can perform other goods for which he lives, because the intelligent being is not contented with living to live, but to do something with his life.
All this does not mean that man always considers, whenever he acts, this subordination and hierarchy of desired goods. It means simply that, when he stops to think, he can know this subordination of appetites, and can even leave relatively unsatisfied some inferior appetite in order to better fulfil a superior appetite. The virtuous man is he who has so mastered his appetites, so that all in him desires according to the rational appetite of happiness. For that reason the virtuous man, according to this vision, is a man who knows how to be happy, because he can maintain the rectitude of the appetites towards the best of his possibilities vicious man lives under his possibilities.
The most pressing appetites are the most basic, such as the nutritive appetite or the sexual appetite, because from the lack of satisfying them, normally a certain psychosomatic alteration is derived. But, the rank in the hierarchy of the appetites is not derived from its respective urgency, but by its greater or smaller finality ultimateness. We have seen previously that in this hierarchy of appetites, there is an appetite that does not serve any other, and in whose service all the others exist.
For, to repeat, we know the nature of a dynamic reality such as ours by knowing the capacities of this kind of being, and the capacities in their turn by knowing the activities of which such beings are capable, and we understand those activities only by understanding their point—and that point is precisely what one is identifying in identifying each of the RFDCL - Nova fase - v. Only with time man realizes that life has a meaning; that there exists a dominant appetite; he realizes that genuine human life is not a succession of disjointed satisfactions of appetites; he realizes that everything one desires, is such because it is able to be integrated in a unifying project, i.
In the measure in which man is maturing, he is integrating his appetites. The gluttonous boy, for example, has not applied the correct measure to his nutritive appetite, a measure that derives from the appetite of a supe- rior good, as it is the appetite to conserve health or beauty. The gluttonous boy, and in general immature people, does not perceive the concatenation of the appetizing hierarchy by virtue of which the superior appetites establish the measure of the inferior ones. We could identify the fullness of the maturity with a suitable integration of all the appetites, or what is the same, with the same virtuous life.
But why this reference to the appetites when we want to talk about the first principle and about the other principles of natural law? Because in the practical order the first principle is the last desired end —unless the first principle were conceived as if it were a form of every practical reasoning , and all the appetites exist in order to obtain and to the service of the last end. The goods desired naturally by man, will be principles of natural law in the measure in which, in light of them, practical reasoning is articulated, and in the measure in which such goods are also means ends-means to obtain other superior goods.
The natural appetites are, for that reason, certain signs and principia of morality, but they are not the decisive criterion. And they will be means as much more valuable in the measure in that they are more necessary for the attainment of the last end. Therefore, it seems that it is possible to set down an objective hierarchy between those ends-means, because of its greater or smaller necessity for the attainment of the last end, which is completely necessary.
Thomas in art. A study of the articulation of such principles in the structure of practical reasoning Can we conclude, based on what we just said, that a correct practical reasoning is, for that reason, a morally good reasoning? Not necessarily. Essential for a practical syllogism —a practical reasoning can consist of many practical syllogisms is the existence of a major premise that is an objective to obtain by means of action; an objective in view of which the means are chosen, means that are considered more apt to obtain that end.
And thus each practical syllogism will be much better, more suitably dispose or order the means by which one obtains the aim established by the major premise. The major premise is an appetizing act of, at least, an apparent good, and the conclusion of each practical syllogism is always a decision by which are chosen the means considered more suitable to obtain the aim of the major premise.
The fact that the material execution of the chosen act could be carried out by another person, regardless of who makes the practical reasoning, does not go against the practical nature of that reasoning, and therefore does not deprive responsibility from the agent who made that reasoning this consideration is especially important for the philosophy of Law.
What is proper to reasoning practically is to dispose choosing, electing that one thing an end has to be done by means of another the means chosen. And although as the major premise of the practical syllogism, as their conclusion decisions , can be formulated propositionally, they are not propositions, but, as we have said, they are appetitive acts controlled by reason. The question is then to determine if there is a unique objective that gives sense to all the actions that are directed towards it. Such an objective therefore would be the first principle of acting, this is, the first principle of practical reason.
And if there is such a unique objective, in light of which the actions 7 To such an extent this is thus in the doctrine of St. Thomas, that the acts of ordering and begging are also acts of the practical reason, because they suppose a certain arrangement in the sense that a man disposes that something has to be done by means of another. If we accept that reality, including the reality of human existence, is finalized, then man can look for not invent the sense, that it is the end of his own existence, and, he can, by means of his choices, adapt himself to it, or reject it.
The knowledge of the essence follows the knowledge of the end, which is the decisive thing.
It is possible to reason practically, but without reference to a final end it is not possible to justify completely a moral reasoning. Before continuing, it is necessary to make clear the distinction between the morality of a practical judgment and the speculative judgment on the morality of that practical judgment.
When we do a practical judgement, that is, when we deliberate and we choose something, we are acting morally and in a certain sense judging morally, but we are not necessarily making a judgment relative to the final end; this we begin to do when we reflect speculatively on the morality of a practical judgment. We have seen before that human appetites have a hierarchy, and that the appetites of certain things make possible or make easier the achievement of superior goods also desired, and also we have seen that in the measure in which a person develops his intelligence, he is more able to perceive that hierarchy of appetites, precisely because he is more able to appreciate superior goods education consists basically in this.
The actions, by which we procure the correlative goods of the different appetites, are morally good in the measure in which they are able to be integrated in the fundamental appetite of the last end. This does not mean that the decisions we 8 To accept that the existence of man is naturally finalized, does not justify the obligatory nature of Nature, if we do not achieve the knowledge that the natural order responds to an omniscient project of an Absolute Being.
The tendency, so many times renewed, to deny moral normativity of Nature is a reasonable attitude on the part of those who do not see in Nature more than an accidental product non causal , on which everyone can impose the sense that each wants. But in this logic of the transvestite, one should not impede an old person, who feels very young, from demanding the right to be considered young or at least not as old, and one would have to permit a change on his birth certificate, because he could also argue that he was born on a mistaken date…The rebellion against Nature is a rebellion against reality.
What this means is that when we stop to reflect on the morality of such actions, it is inevitable that we question ourselves about the aptitude of such actions to achieve the end that we consider last in our life. This is thus because the reflective moral judgment is a judgment that qualify the person as person. When we compare the aptitude of the action to obtain a non-last end, like for example, the action of the cobbler who fixes shoes, we qualify it as bad or good, only in view of such aim the end to fix the shoes well , and therefore is not a moral judgment.
The moral judgment, which also can be applied to the same action, always has an ultimate ratio: Is he becoming a better person through this action of fixing shoes? Or said with other words: Is he approaching more his last end by means of the action of fixing shoes? This is indeed a moral question. Perhaps with this example we can see more clearly that moral good or evil is not primarily determined by reference to some essence, but by reference to an end; and not by reference to just any end, but by reference to the last end.
Not in vain is the immorality of a religious person usually more surprising, than that of an atheist, for the simple reason that we presume that the religious person usually calibrates his acts in reference to a last end, more so than the atheist. We think that this thesis means something very similar to the neoclassical idea, that affirms that the moral rationality is identified with the fullness of practical rationality, because the neoclassicists understand that the practical rationality is total when it structures all the elections of a life in view of a last end indeed for that reason we can speak of one life.
All practical reasoning is made at heart in view of the first end: F1, before which all the other aims are means, and are desired because at heart one desires F1. Within each one of the practical syllogisms, election consists of the preference that we give to one possibility among those that are at our reach to obtain the respective end, which presupposes, in addition to an act of knowledge by which we compare the diverse possibilities , an appetitive act, towards one we are more inclined than the others.
We think that the neoclassicists have the merit of having provoked the reflection 10 Cf. Germain Grisez, Joseph M. But, in our opinion, they are not very clear when considering that such principles do not need another end to justify their goodness in certain way, for that reason, they are last. The fact that the appetite of such goods is a practically universal reality, and that for that reason we consider reasonable the actions that tend to them, does not mean necessarily that they are last goods. And we think that, at least for two reasons: First, because, as we have seen, it is contrary to the notion of last end the existence of several equally last ends.
Secondly, because the degree of ultimateness of a good is not measured necessarily by its degree of evidence, but because once obtained, the will is calmed down completely, because the reason understands that the will possess totally the good that it loves. An exposition on the relation of the common good with the last end of human existence The thesis that we defend, and that we think conforms with the thinking of St. In other words, the common living is not a simple 11 There is a divulging work of the philosophy of Grisez written by himself in collaboration with Russell Shaw: Beyond the new Morality.
In such a way that if for example, somebody asked us why or what is the cause for reading a book of Aristotle, and if we responded that we read it only to finish it, or just because someone has ordered us, we would not be giving a sufficiently justificatory answer for our action. However if we say that the cause that moves us to read the book is simply the desire to know human good of knowledge or to help a friend human good of friendship , then we would be giving a sufficiently justificatory and reasonable answer, that would not require further explanation to make our action completely intelligible.
If it is desirable to live, it is for something. And the same could be said of knowledge: nobody wants to know something simply to know something, because if that were true, the simple fact of knowing more data for example to know the telephone directory by heart would be a more valuable intellectual achievement than any other. Man wants to know something to become a better person. And something similar could be said of all of the basic human goods. Therefore, our thesis is that human goods are really such in the measure in which they serve man to obtain his last end.
Moreover, the reference to the last end is indeed the reason for the goodness of all the human goods. The decisive question is therefore to know if it is possible to acquire the knowledge of the last end and how. Thomas explains that the last end of each being is the fullness of its form, and while this is not obtained, the being literally lives in tension to be in tension is to be tending. But once one obtains the fullness of its form, one rests in it as in its own good. And because in man all his appetitive dynamism is at the service of the will, which is the appetite of the last end, when the will reaches it, all the appetites rest, because there is nothing left to desire the will only moves itself because it desires something that it yet does not have.
We think that the dualist vision of the human being, that contemplates spiritual life as something independent from the material life, does not do justice to the psychology of man, because the common experience shows us that this dynamism towards the last end is as if it were impressed in all parts of our body, including the most basic appetites.
The moral effort consists precisely in obtaining a harmonic conjunction of all the appetites based on the architectonic appetite of the last end. This conjunction is given to us already inchoated by Nature. For St. Thomas, the last end of man is not the mere individual accomplishment, where the community would only play an instrumental role for the attainment of this aim. Thomas the last end of man is the same coexistence or communio of men to each other and with God himself.
To say that man is naturally social, means 13 Cf. Thomas, that it is in the community where man realizes himself and because of it he maintains himself realized. This common end is neither a mere result that will only and completely take place in the future, all or nothing, but it is a participative end that begins in the earthly existence and could be progressively consolidated throughout the personal history of each man and the history of humanity as a whole to what extent the political society and the Church could present inchoate this communitarian and unifying dynamism of human existence, is a subject to develop, that St.
Thomas did not develop fully, and that goes beyond the limits of this work, which intends to be more philosophical than theological. This universal common good understood as communio , that is the end, can be illustrated with an image, that perhaps could seem excessively poetic, but a better way of expressing it does not occur to us at the moment to refer to a reality that escapes from an analytical way of knowing.
Common good would be like a cosmic symphony formed by all Creation, in which men would play the role of musicians with their respective instruments the life that each one has been called to live , and where the rest of the irrational creatures would play an instrumental role at the service of men, like accompaniment or like elements of the same instruments of men.
All the irrational beings the animals, the plants, the sea, the skies… , being directly moved by God by means of the eternal law, would participate passively in this orchestra. According to this, the individualist vision, the purely individual accomplishment, would be so irrational as if a musician, breaking the harmony, tried to prevail over the others by playing his violin louder evidently, something he could do, but much less of what he could do if integrated in the whole orchestra; and certainly, if he follows only his own, the other also lose.
At the same time, this vision tries to justify the natural communal dimension of human existence, where the mutual service is necessary to one another. Briefly, with this image we try to illustrate that the accomplishment of man is communitarian, necessarily supportive, shared in common, and that it is only obtained when each one personally assumes the role that corresponds to him 48 RFDCL - Nova fase - v.
A reflection on the position that moral virtues occupy, and especially the virtue of justice in the process of practical knowdlege It is in view of this last end that all the appetitive movement is naturally disposed, including the most basic appetites. It is here where moral virtues including justice find their meaning, as soon as each one contributes to adequately dispose man towards his last end. Many of the authors who, in supposed continuity with Aristotle and St. Thomas, have reflected on justice, have emphasized excessively the notion of particular justice, leaving a little to the side the notion of general justice; when it is that general justice is a key piece to understand all the aristotelian-thomist philosophy of virtues.
Therefore, we think that it is worth it to spend a little time with the aristotelian-thomist notion of general justice. But before this, it is convenient to notice that the treatment that both St. Thomas and Aristotle make of justice is fundamentally moral: rather, justice, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is with all propriety called a moral virtue. We think that this reflection on that is to say the hard core of the concept of justice, has to precede the discussion of the legal positive dimension of justice.
Cum igitur quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi, nec totum potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis. With respect to the degree of virtue that citizens should have, St. Thomas does not say that they should have the integrity of the virtue, but only that degree of virtue necessary to maintain the community.
We advance that the judicial common good would be determined by the indispensable minimum of solidarity that could be demanded by the governor in the concrete historical community over which they govern. In order to understand this more clearly it is convenient to read the writing of St. Ad huius intelligentiam sciendum est, quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice. Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, idest definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino. Utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis.
Aequivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem: sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in definitione sive significatione: id enim quod significatur per nomen, est definitio, sicut dicitur in quarto Metaph. Analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus. Dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati.
Aristotle explains this by comparing virtues with the arts that are to each other subordinated in sequence to the attainment of the end of the main art. For example, the art of making saddles is subordinated to the equestrian art, and this one is also subordinated to the military art. And the habit by which man adequately disposes himself to coexistence with others is justice. In other words, if virtue is perfection of man by which he carries away the work begun by nature, and man is naturally a social being, justice, in so far as it perfects the social dimension of man, perfects man himself.
And since man, due to his corporal nature, only communicates by means of external actions, signs, and things we do not communicate among ourselves telepathically , justice —while being an internal disposition will manifest only on these external things by which people relate to each other. If each man, thanks to the other moral virtues, tunes his sensitive passions so that they respond adequately to his own reason, by justice he tunes his own will, so that it could stably tend to the good of the neighbour.
This is a continuous process in which justice is like the last step of virtue; virtue that begins to form and to hold fast by temperance and fortitude, but that culminates in justice. In other words, the sensitive passions —disciplined by the other moral virtues do not directly dispose man to his neighbor, however their effects, the outer operations, are ordenable to the neighbour, and this is obtained by means of the virtue of justice.
When Aristotle says that general justice is the complete or perfect moral virtue, he is saying that the order impressed by reason in the appetites is only a means for the adequate disposition of the will of man towards others. In other words, the order impressed in the sensitive appetites by the other moral virtues, is made in view of the exterior operations, and this order is maintained relatively unaltered in outer works thanks to the virtue of justice.
In this sense it is necessary to interpret the classic saying Iustitia in se omnem virtutem complectitur, because the virtue of justice always presupposes the other virtues. Explained inversely, we can say that in the root of almost all injustice there is always an immorality of another species different from the injustice. For example, many murders are committed by a lack of 17 In the commentary of St. Contingit enim unum habitum operativum, quem vocat virtutem, sub alio esse.
Sicut ars quae facit frena est sub arte equitandi, quia ille qui debet equitare praecipit artifici qualiter faciat frenum. Et sic est architector, idest principalis artifex respectu ipsius. Et eadem ratio est de aliis artibus, quae faciunt alia instrumenta necessaria ad equitandum, puta sellas, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Equestris autem ulterius ordinatur sub militari. Milites enim dicebantur antiquitus non solum equites, sed quicumque pugnatores ad vincendum. Unde sub militari continetur non solum equestris, sed omnis ars vel virtus ordinata ad bellicam operationem, sicut sagittaria, fundibularia vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi.
Et per eundem modum aliae artes sub aliis. Between the many consequences that could be derived from this consideration, we could emphasize that educating for justice presupposes educating the affection or appetites, teaching future citizens to live other virtues that apparently do not have social importance. The will of the debtor is regulated by the good pertaining and convenient to the other the creditor , and not by the sensitive appetites of the debtor. Justice perfects the will, not the sensitive appetites, that are presupposed as being perfected at the moment that justice as virtue intervenes.
Since justice is the improvement of the will in which it concerns primarily to the good of others, and since this good of others is only the object for reason no sensible tendency is inclined as its own good to the good of the neighbour , justice does not perfect any sensible inclination —it presupposes them perfected , but only perfects the will. The good of another human being is also my good. This affirmation presupposes that the other forms part of the same whole of which I also form part. And that is so for at least two reasons: first because the good of the other is also the good of the agent, since the good of a part who is the individual presupposes that the other parts are also suitably disposed; and second, because the virtue of justice manifests the perfection of the other moral virtues in the agent.
The other moral virtues consist of a certain impression of the rational order in the sensitive appetites; appetites that, for being naturally irrational, only can tend towards their respective partial goods for example, because of the nutritive appetite one tends to feed oneself, not the other, except for maybe the maternal instinct; the sexual appetite desires sexual relations when certain circumstances arise, and so on , and in the measure in which they are moderated by moral virtue, are somewhat domesticated, so that apetites desire when they must and as they must, this is, according to reason.
When someone captures this double reason of goodness of his acts, then man begins to have the virtue of justice general justice in the sense that we are exposing here, which is a genuinely moral sense. Obviously, recognizing the-good-of-the-other as object of the virtue of justice, presupposes to recognize that there are other human beings who form part of the same community with the same entitlement as I. Thinking once again of the orchestra analogy, when we see the other as part of the same set, we recognize to him the means that are necessary to integrate himself, and to correctly maintain, in the community.
When these goods that each one really needs can only be achieved through the intervention of my will, or when the legitimate possession of the goods can only be maintained through the intervention of my will, then I find myself in the position of debtor. Thomas explains that although the common function of all justice is to order each man in relation to each other, this order can be found in two ways: considering the other individually, or considering the other in common, in the sense that he who serves a community, serves all of those who comprise that community.
And when it is chosen motivated in first term by the good of the community as a whole, therefore we formally speak of legal justice as another species of justice. The distinction referred to in the previous paragraph is quite subtle, because the difference does not depend on the materiality of the act, but rather depends on the near end of the action.
The acts of all the virtues either disposing man towards himself, or either towards other singular people, as it is the case of particular justice are ordenable to common good in two ways: one, with secondary intention, and another one with main intention. In this second case we are before a specific act of legal justice.
Giuseppe Abba, Felicidad, vida buena y virtud, Barcelona: Eiunsa, , First edited in italian in 19 Cf. One of these senses we have already seen in the proceeding paragraph: legal justice as specific virtue when the near motivation is the common good. But also they use the expression legal or general justice to talk about the general form of all justice, because all justice always orders, immediately or mediately, towards the common good most of the time mediately. Briefly we could say: All the virtues are aspects of the same personal realization. The personal realization is only completed in coexistence.
Justice manifests that the other virtues have taken root, because by justice transcends towards the others the adequate arrangement of all the appetites. Only when a person dominates his appetites, can he adequately dispose himself towards others. This suitable communication can be done by primarily taking care of the good of the whole, or by taking care, in first term, of some particular member of that whole. And it is common to all justice the contribution to the common good, directly or indirectly.
We have to say that if there were a specific justice of the governor that it would be legal justice as specific justice but neither it would be correct to attribute only to the governor legal justice. Whoever has to distribute goods that are common is the one who lives distributive justice. The origin of the erroneous interpretation of the thought of Aquinas —extended between many authors supposedly Thomists- is in the famous commentary by Cardinal Cayetano to II-II, q.
Thomas distinguishes between commutative justice and distributive justice. Aquinas had devoted an article to the question whether it is proper to divide justice into two species, distributive and commutative, and had argued that it is. II-II, q. And likewise there are three justices: legal, distributive and commutative. Legal justice pertains to the first sort, since it relates the citizens to the State.
Distributive justice pertains to the second sort, since it relates the State to the citizens. Merkelbach, Summa theolgiae moralis Paris: , vol. II, no. When there is virtue this contradiction is usually minimal, because the appetites of the virtuous man usually desire according to reason The virtuous man passionately do that which is good, that is to say, in tune with his passions, because he suitably has them in tune with the reason. The virtue of justice is a virtue rooted in the will, by which man tends to want and to enjoy in the good of the fellow man, and this without being impeded, rather being accompanied, by the sensitive appetites.
For that reason the virtue of justice demands as necessary condition, but non sufficient, the existence of the other moral virtues, because nobody can become accustomed to wanting, without feeling, the good of his fellow man. Precisely because justice is a virtue that is rooted in the will, and will is the intellectual appetite, justice necessarily presupposes the ability of the mind to discern the good of the fellow man.
For that reason the virtue of justice is a virtue that if by the side of the sensitive appetites requires temperance and fortitude, on the side of understanding it requires prudence. Perhaps at this point we have arrived at a better understanding of the idea that justice includes in itself all the virtues. It would be possible to disagree with this paper that the function of jurists or of politicians is much more modest. Certainly the politicians or the jurists have interest in the just acts, done with or without virtue, and, in addition, in just a few, only in those that are considered necessary for the minimum social cohesion.
If we admit that all the moral dynamism is a centripetal movement of increasing solidarity, to the positive law we could demand the determination of the minimum threshold of cohesion or indispensable solidarity, below which it is understood that life in community would be worthless [in Spanish we could say: el derecho se justifica porque la convivencia vale la pena]. Certainly the legal field is much more restricted than the moral, but without knowing the moral science we would not know where the legal ends and where the merely moral begins most of the legal obligations are also moral obligations ; nor when the legal becomes immoral; and what is most important, in the measure in which legal science including legal philosophy is not only science 54 RFDCL - Nova fase - v.
A renewed argument on the impertinence of most of the criticisisms levelled against iusnaturalism in the last three centuries The iusnaturalism that has been targeted by almost all the critics from the beginning of Modernity to the present time, has been and continues to be a iusnaturalism of the rationalist court. In addition, it is necessary to recognize that a good part of the iusnaturalists that dissented and dissent from rationalism, if they misunderstand the structure of practical reasoning, they will hardly be able to be differentiated from the rationalist ones unless they profess a theological voluntarism.
Thomas about natural law. The image of natural law that begins to develop in the universities since the 17th century, derived little by little from a iusnaturalism of ends, understood as human goods in view of which reason organizes the most suitable means to obtain the ends, towards a iusnaturalism made of rules. Thomas, as if it were his true philosophy.
One of the greater merits of Grisez, followed in this point by Finnis, and by the other neoclassicists, lies in the denunciation they do of this adulteration. In interpreting the thought of St.
For Aristotle, however, public morality can only refer to rough guidelines, as each individual has to find the mean that suits the individual characteristics of the actor and the situation. My cokehead girlfriend seeks me out in the wee hours to say she loves me I gaze at the dark rings under her eyes as dark as the night out there. And it is not properly law because it simply does not serve to conform the community, because the unjust law is a disturbing or disintegrating element of the community,25 because such is a negation of his final cause. Allisson Jean-Jacques, Une affaire de famille 56 ans durant. Sakarikos V. Aristotle reflects on whether this kind of demonstration does away with the hypothetical nature of mathematical propositions, and his answer is no. Academica Press, LLC,
But neither this image corresponds to the philosophy of St. It is true that in some passages of his Summa, but especially in the First Part, St. Thomas refers to the natural as what is necessary, and that it is, therefore, removed from the dominion of freedom, but from this we cannot conclude that natural law is the law of necessity, excluding from it freedom and reason. Thomas in the Second Part of the Summa does not grow tired of saying that the natural thing in man is to have reason and will.
Therefore, it is a mistake to interpret that St. Thomas put in opposition nature with reason and will. If it is an error to identify the nature with necessity, still a greater error is to identify the natural with what happens frequently, as Hume does. When St. Thomas says that such-and-such human behaviour is natural, he does not mean that it is the most frequent according to the statistics, nor that it is spontaneous for St.
Thomas not all that is spontaneous in man is good : natural in man is that which is reasonable. A reformulation of the analogical concept of law as a correct disposition of the parts towards the common good as end For Aquinas, law, in relation to man, has in general the function of helping him so that he may suitably dispose himself towards the common good.
Human law orients man towards the political common good if man is correctly disposed towards this good, we say that he is a good citizen. Natural law however, orients man towards an end, that is more ultimate than the political common good, that is the universal common good if man is correctly dispose towards this end, we say that he is a good person. For this reason St. Thomas does not see law as an obstacle to the 23 In addition, Suarez thinks that as natural law is in itself a divine rule, the acts in conformity with it have an additional value, precisely by its conformity to the law.
The fundamental problem of Suarez consists in interpreting all of St. Haec est mens D. Thomae q. It is surprising the flippancy with which Suarez attributes this thought to St. Thomas and to Aristotle. The participation of man in the good of the political community is only an intermediate step and an aid to participate better in the common universal good. We have seen previously that human virtue is essentially a disposition towards the common good. We saw that this was thus because virtue is equivalent to personal perfection, and the perfection of something that is part of a whole, has to be appreciated by the relationship that it keeps with the whole of which it is a part.
For that reason law, in general, is considered an external aid for personal accomplishment. The common good is the same community well done, the quality of the living together, the worth of the coexistence, and law helps to make that community, where each one finds their own realization. The community is the fruit of the law, because the law adequately disposes the parts in order to construct the community as a whole. And since the community conformed by the laws can be of a very diverse nature, diverse levels of common good can be distinguished, with their respective species of laws.
What for Aristotle was the last end of man, the realization through the political common good, for Aquinas that will only be a particular end, the political coexistence, a mere stage of the centripetal dynamism of the law in general, that will reach its perfection in the kingdom of God, fully realized in the eternal life. And it is not properly law because it simply does not serve to conform the community, because the unjust law is a disturbing or disintegrating element of the community,25 because such is a negation of his final cause.
If an essential note of law consists in linking what is diverse, a law that destroys the community is not a law; it is precisely the negation of law: as poison is not a medicine, no matter how much it is sold in pharmacies, the unjust law is not properly a law, but its contradiction. Unjust law perhaps maintains its efficient and material cause, because it has been promulgated by its legitimate ruler, but if it lacks its final cause, it therefore lacks the most important.
If the best governor is the one who unites more closely his people, in a harmonious and pacific coexistence, he who destroys this coexistence is the worse one of all. The law, as so, thus understood, is not principle of acts. Principles of acts are the 24 Cf. I-II: q. Law has got reason of means, not of end. The reason of man catches those ends, which are desired naturally by will, and dispose the better way to obtain them.
In the thought of St. Thomas, Law is an external aid, created by other men or directly disposed by God, in order to dispose the acts of men towards that common end, which constitutes their good, where men find their happiness. Community, communio, living together, happiness, realization, coexistence For all that we have seen up to here, the philosophy of Aristotle and St.
Thomas is very far from the individualism that considers happiness as a merely personal accomplishment. Thomas, man reaches happiness in the measure in which he inserts himself in the coexistence with others, and suitably assumes the role that he plays in the community of which he is a part. Man in solitaire falls apart. Man realizes himself only in the measure in which he suitably forms part of that work or universal symphony that is the creative work of God, a symphony which constitutes the end of all Creation, where the inferior creatures are at the service of the superior ones, and therefore all the inferior material nature is done in view of man and for his realization.
Thomas says, the part is ordered to the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect, the individual man is ordered to the perfect community to find in it his perfection, which is his happiness. Bonum autem totius universi est id quod est apprehensum a Deo, qui est universi factor et gubernator, unde quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni communis, quod est sua bonitas, quae est bonum totius universi. Non est autem recta voluntas alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare, nisi referat illud in bonum commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur in bonum commune totius.
Aquinas summarizes his vision obout the cosmic order in the following passage of his Compendium theologiae, lib. In omni enim ordine finium, quae sunt propinquiora ultimo fini, sunt etiam fines eorum quae sunt magis remota: sicut potio medicinae est propter purgationem, purgatio autem propter maciem, macies autem propter sanitatem, et sic macies finis est quodammodo purgationis, sicut etiam potionis purgatio.
Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Sicut enim in ordine causarum agentium virtus primi agentis pervenit ad ultimos effectus per medias causas, ita in ordine finium, quae sunt magis remota a fine, pertingunt ad ultimum finem mediantibus his quae sunt magis propinqua fini: sicut potio non ordinatur ad sanitatem nisi per purgationem. Unde et in ordine universi inferiora consequuntur praecipue ultimum finem inquantum ordinantur ad superiora.
Hoc etiam manifeste apparet ipsum rerum ordinem consideranti. Cum enim ea quae naturaliter fiunt, sicut nata sunt agi, sic agantur, videmus autem imperfectiora cedere ad usum nobiliorum, utpote quod plantae nutriuntur ex terra, animalia ex plantis, haec autem ad usum hominis cedunt, consequens est ut inanimata sint propter animata, et plantae propter animalia, et haec propter hominem.
Cum autem ostensum sit quod natura intellectualis sit superior corporali, consequens est ut tota natura corporalis ad intellectualem ordinetur. Inter naturas autem intellectuales, quae maxime corpori est vicina, est anima rationalis, quae est hominis forma.
Igitur quodammodo propter hominem, inquantum est rationabile animal, tota natura corporalis esse videtur. Ex consummatione igitur hominis consummatio totius naturae corporalis quodammodo dependet. Thomas says that law belongs to reason, we have to understand that he opposes it to the appetite. All appetites have their natural proper goods, that man does not choose to have; including rational appetite or will, that tends towards its own good, a good without restriction, that nobody can fail to want. In order to satisfy this rational appetite, we do everything what we chose to do.
Reason tends to dispose, choosing the means more adapted, in order to obtain that desired happiness. For that reason law, in general, is mainly a work of prudence prudence is the virtue by which one chose the most appropriate means to obtain the last end. And if law obligates, it is because the good naturally desired by will is a good for man; for this reason the obligation of law has the same intensity of the degree of convenience of the good towards which the law disposes. According to St.
Thomas, natural law and positive law are elaborated by human reason from the human goods naturally known as such, and these are goods precisely by their common reference to the last end. Certainly, they are goods because they are appetizing, regardless of whether we know their relation to the last end. But reason can discover the relation among the diverse goods that we naturally desire, some from the very beginning of our lives, and others developed with the passage of time.
It will be the greater or smaller necessity of the means to obtain such goods which allow us to calibrate the degree of freedom of the legislator to notice the content of law for those who identify naturalness with necessity —we do not do that-, it would be possible to say that the degree of necessity of means is what determines the degree of naturalness of law, that is to say, the content of natural law removed from the arbitrary human. This freedom will be smaller when human law is derived from the natural law by way of conclusion.
However, when it is derived by way of determination, the legislator chooses between several possible means the one that, according to the circumstances of his community, seems to him more apt to obtain the end. This explains why, in Aquinas, the distinction between the content of natural law from that of positive law, from a determined point of necessity, does not have precise contours.
At the beginning of this work we saw that the goods desired naturally by the will, understood as rational appetite, are the principles of natural law, because by them the creative process of law commences, that is a work of reason. We have already seen that it is an error to think that, according to St.
Thomas, principles of natural law are rules. It is convenient to insist that they are not rules, but goods naturally desired by the will, by the rational appetite. Law, therefore, is the plan drawn up by reason in view of such human goods. And if law is not only declarative, but also it prescribes, it is because the goods to which law leads, present themselves as appealing to the will as rational appetite.
For that reason the criticism of Hume, which derives the ought from the is, deriving prescriptive norms from descriptive statements, is an erroneous criticism if it is applied to Aquinas. Thomas does not derive the obligatory character of law from a speculative principle, but from a practical principle, this is, from a good that appeals directly and by itself to the human will, that is the human rational appetite.
While animals order themselves to the end by their instinct rather animals are ordered by their instincts , without knowing the end or even choosing the means, man orders himself to the end to which he naturally tends with the aid of law. Thomas explains that law is the appropriate way to govern the human person, because he can perceive with reason the ratio ordinis of the law, and because he has dominion over his own actions. Because man is governed by means of law, and because he also governs other men through law, by one side he makes his participation in the community commendable he is not forced , and by another side he participates in the government of the world to which God associates him, granting him the dignity of being second cause in the disposition in the ordering of everything towards the last end, which is the universal common good.
This governing of man by means of the law is of an order superior to the government by means of the natural inclinations that God puts in his creatures. That law is the most conforming way to govern the human person, in accordance to his dignity, it is also manifested through the comparison with the government of man on irrational beings. All the unfolded activity in the use of irrational things subordinated to man, is reduced to the acts man performs with them if they are inert realities the reason is clear, for example when one uses tools; and if they are living irrational beings, the motive resides in the automatism that occurs between the stimulus and the response when man provokes the appetites of the animal.
For that reason man does not impose laws on irrational beings, no matter how much they are subjected to him, but he moves them by force, even though it seems that they obey freely. Human legislator, however, gives laws to the men of the community that he governs, when he imprints in their minds, with whatever mandate or indication, a rule in view of the conformation of the community that he directs. In this task, he is also participating, consciously or unconsciously, in the task of reunification, which disposes everything towards the universal common good.
We insist that men associate with other men not just for material sustenance, but more so because men look for coexistence with 28 Cf. The common good is always relative to a certain community. And for that reason the justice of law has to be evaluated in relation to the common good of the community for which it is dictated. The definition of the common good of any community is the expression of the end of that community, the expression of the reason of its constitution or existence. Perhaps, with this perspective, it is better understood what we have said before: that the function of law is to maintain or to conform a community.
Now, it is convenient to make a distinction that is not explicit in Aquinas, which if not noticed, could impede a suitable understanding of a good part of his thinking. The social integral common good comprehends all the goods that are presupposed by the common life of men. Man contributes to this common good by the acts of all his virtues, including those that at first sight only affect his private life for example, acts of fortitude or chastity , and of course, also contributes to this common good all the social institutions such as family, religious communities, and the multitude of diverse associations that work within the political community.
According to this more restricted notion of common good, there would be vicious private behaviours that would not affect directly the political common good; and therefore would not have to be prohibited by the law, although they affect the social integral common good. If Aquinas recognizes that the moral category of the singular people always impact, in some way, the quality of coexistence between men the social integral common good , he also recognizes that this influence admits degrees, and that the determination of the degree in which human law must intervene, is a relative question that depends on many factors the level of education of the people, the increase of certain type of crime in the community, etc.
What lies within the competence of human legislator is to deter- mine, according to the circumstances, the length of the radius of the first circle, by means of the regulation of the indispensable conducts of the citizens. These two circles would as well be within the circle of the common universal good to which God disposes all Creation.
Thomas, the object of the rules of the human legislator should not surpass those acts of the virtue of justice? In a certain way, yes, because, as we have already seen, only by justice man adjusts his behaviour to the good of another person. We have seen that men communicate among themselves and conform the political community by means of exterior acts, and not simply with mere thought.
For that reason only acts of justice are susceptible to legal regulation —but not all. The acts of other virtues only interest the legislator in the measure in which they affect the order of social life. Thus for example, from the point of view of the educative legislation, it could be worth while to foster the order and temperance of the young people, to foster the courage of the soldiers, the diligence of the police in their investigations, or the chastity of the teachers in their relations with students From this perspective we could situate difficult subjects of legal and political science, such as the treatment that should be given to the pornography.
Finnis explains that, for St. This common good, which is in a sense the common good of the political community, is unlimited the common good of the whole of human life. This specifically political common good is limited and in a sense instrumental. It is what Aquinas, as we have seen, calls public good. Aquinas, op. Actibus enim virtutum opponuntur actus vitiosi. Sed lex humana non prohibet omnia vitia, ut dictum est.
Omnia autem obiecta virtutum referri possunt vel ad bonum privatum alicuius personae, vel ad bonum commune multitudinis, sicut ea quae sunt fortitudinis potest aliquis exequi vel propter conservationem civitatis, vel ad conservandum ius amici sui; et simile est in aliis. Lex autem, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad bonum commune. Et ideo nulla virtus est de cuius actibus lex praecipere non possit. Non tamen de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum lex humana praecipit, sed solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter bonum commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives informantur ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.
This error presupposes an incompatible paternalism with personal and social responsibility that all people have. The governor is not the only one responsible for the common good. Human law indicates the minimum threshold of solidarity, the minimum of contribution to the common good, which can be coercively demanded. But the citizens, who are conscious of the shared-in-common dimension of their existence, assume responsibilities not demanded by the human law, which doubtlessly contribute to the common good.
Without this shared-in-common perspective of existence, which is developed independently of the law, the maintenance of any community would not be possible. When one considers that law, in general, is essentially an aid to help man to more easily reach his end, it makes sense that the coercive character of law does not form part of its definition. This is made clear when St. Nevertheless, the fact that human law also contributes to making men moral, is a frequent and logical effect of it, but is not its own aim.
Human law can have as an indirect effect the promotion of virtue in the measure in which it causes customs, which at the outset can be followed reluctantly for fear of punishment, but soon, once the practice is experienced, the acts could be realized with certain facility and even with joy. Human law must inculcate virtues because it will only work well as a guarantor of justice and peace if its subjects internalize its norms and requirements and more important humana ordinatur ad communitatem civilem, quae est hominum ad invicem.
Homines autem ordinantur ad invicem per exteriores actus, quibus homines sibi invicem communicant. Huiusmodi autem communicatio pertinet ad rationem iustitiae, quae est proprie directiva communitatis humanae. Et ideo lex humana non proponit praecepta nisi de actibus iustitiae; et si praecipiat actus aliarum virtutum, hoc non est nisi inquantum assumunt rationem iustitiae; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic.
Sed communitas ad quam ordinat lex divina, est hominum ad Deum, vel in praesenti [to some extent also this is also object of natural law] vel in futura vita. Et ideo lex divina praecepta proponit de omnibus illis per quae homines bene ordinentur ad communicationem cum Deo. Homo autem Deo coniungitur ratione, sive mente, in qua est Dei imago. Et ideo lex divina praecepta proponit de omnibus illis per quae ratio hominis est bene ordinata. Hoc autem contingit per actus omnium virtutum, nam virtutes intellectuales ordinant bene actus rationis in seipsis; virtutes autem morales ordinant bene actus rationis circa interiores passiones et exteriores operationes.
The public good cannot be well preserved if people are untrustworthy, vengeful, willing to evade their taxes and other civic duties, biased in jury service, and so forth. So the preservation of public good needs people to have the virtue, the inner dispositions, of justice. And if that is a legitimate purpose, then it must be at least a legitimate interest of government that citizens have other virtues too. The primary role corresponds to families, religious institutions, private associations, and other institutions that, working closely with the individuals, collaborate in the diffusion of the morality and promotion of virtue.
Ordinarily, at least, the role of the law is to support families, religious associations and the like.